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Over the last decade, much of the patent law literature has focused on the
problem of "patent trolls," or patent owners who don't make products, but sue
others that do. The basic complaint against these types of entities is that they
impose a tax on innovation without providing offsetting societal benefits. Fur-
thermore, their patent assertions have been on the rise, with a significant per-
centage of patent suits now attributable to them. In short, the troll
phenomenon suggests a problem of excessive patent assertions.
But despite the importance of the troll phenomenon, the fact remains that
most patents are never asserted, or are asserted less than they could be. Under-
assertion of patents thus appears to be more prevalent than over-assertion.
Yet, beyond noting a set of generic economic considerations that may lead to
this outcome, the literature fails to provide systematic, industry-specific assess-
ments of why patent owners choose to forego asserting their rights in so many
cases. And the generic nature of these assessments is particularly problematic
given that patents play significantly different roles from one industry to the
next, as scholars have noted for some time.
This Article addresses these issues by providing an industry-specific, in-
formal model for theorizing why patent owners forego asserting their rights in
so many cases (and why they may not in others). It briefly applies this model
to four industries: software, pharmaceuticals, biotechnology, and semiconduc-
tors. The Article then explores some potential implications of this industry-
specific model. In particular, this Article suggests that high barriers to patent
assertion in an industry may, ironically, result in increased patent trolling in
the industry. Hence, this Article provides guidance to policymakers by helping
explain the rise of patent assertions in some industries, such as software, as
well as helping to identify other industries, such as biotechnology, that may be
increasingly at risk of patent trolling.
* Associate Professor of Law, BYU Law School. M.Phil., University of Cambridge. J.D.,
Stanford Law School. For helpful comments on this Article, many thanks to Jonas Anderson,
Stephanie Bair, Christopher Bradley, Chris Buccafusco, Dan Burk, Jorge Contreras, Brian Frye,
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INTRODUCTION
On July 6, 2010, the United States Patent and Trademark Office
("USPTO") granted Amazon.com, Inc. a patent that, according to
multiple sources, appeared to cover Barnes & Noble's Nook e-
Reader, Amazon's primary competition in the e-Reader market at the
time.' If the patent did cover the Nook, it would provide Amazon with
1 Devin Coldewey, Amazon's Original Kindle Patent Could Spell Trouble for Competi-
tors, TECHCRUNCH (July 6, 2010), http://techcrunch.com/2010/07/06/amazons-original-kindle-pat
ent-could-spell-trouble-for-competitors/; Ryan Fleming, Amazon Wins e-Reader Patent, How
Will This Affect the Nook, DIGITAL TRENDS (July 7, 2010, 3:04 PM), http://www.digitaltrends.
comlcool-techlamazon-wins-e-reader-patent-how-will-this-affect-the-nook/; Nilay Patel, Amazon
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significant remedies against Barnes & Noble, including potential in-
junctive relief, monetary damages, and attorney's fees.2 All Amazon
had to do was assert the patent against Barnes & Noble to find out.
Yet Amazon never did formally assert its patent against Barnes & No-
ble.3 Given the possible benefits of doing so, the question looms large:
why not?
This question becomes even more interesting in context. Over the
past decade, scholars have devoted most of their attention to the op-
posite issue: excessive assertion of patent rights. For instance, the
"non-practicing entity," "patent-assertion entity," or "patent troll"
problem-where patent owners neither make nor provide goods and
services to the public, instead asserting patents against others that
do-has resulted in a voluminous literature.4 The basic complaint
against patent trolls is that they abuse patent rights for their own mon-
etary benefit, while providing no commensurate benefit to society.5
This trolling problem has become such a concern that it has attracted
the attention of the President of the United States, 6 Congress,7 the
Kindle Dual-Screen e-Reader Patent Granted, Barnes & Noble Nook Potentially in Trouble, EN-
GADGET (July 6, 2010), http://www.engadget.com/2010/07/06/amazon-kindle-dual-screen-e-
reader-patent-granted-barnes-and-nobl/.
2 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 283-285 (2012) (laying out the remedies available for infringement of a
patent, including injunctive relief, money damages, and attorney's fees).
3 It remains possible that the two parties entered into a license agreement with respect to
the patent, which, if true, represents a form of rights assertion that is simply difficult to account
for because of the secret nature of many such transactions.
4 The "troll" literature would be difficult to capture in a single footnote. For some of the
more prominent studies, see James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, The Direct Costs from NPE
Disputes, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 387 (2014); Robin Feldman, The Pace of Change: Non-Practicing
Entities and the Shifting Legal Landscape, 18 CHAP. L. REV. 635 (2015); John M. Golden, "Patent
Trolls" and Patent Remedies, 85 TEX. L. REV. 2111 (2007); Mark A. Lemley & A. Douglas
Melamed, Missing the Forest for the Trolls, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 2117 (2013); Gerard N. Mag-
liocca, Blackberries and Barnyards: Patent Trolls and the Perils of Innovation, 82 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 1809 (2007); Michael Risch, Patent Troll Myths, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 457 (2012);
James F. McDonough III, Comment, The Myth of the Patent Troll: An Alternative View of the
Function of Patent Dealers in an Idea Economy, 56 EMORY L.J. 189 (2006).
5 Lemley & Melamed, supra note 4, at 2124 ("There is widespread belief that trolls im-
pose greater costs on technology users and society as a whole than do practicing entities, and
that they provide little social benefit to offset those costs.").
6 Edward Wyatt, Obama Orders Regulators to Root Out 'Patent Trolls,' N.Y. TIMES (June
4, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/05/business/president-moves-to-curb-patent-
suits.html?_r=0.
7 There have been numerous legislative proposals over the years aimed at addressing
"troll" behavior. For one recent example, see Caroline Craig, Congress to Patent Trolls: You
Shall Not Pass, INFOWORLD (Sept. 18, 2015), http://www.infoworld.com/article/2984696/govern
ment/can-congress-stop-the-patent-trolls.html.
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Federal Trade Commission,8 numerous state legislatures, 9 the popular
press, 0 and frequent academic conferences."
But despite the importance of these topics, the fact remains that
the vast majority of patents are likely never asserted, either formally
in litigation or informally as part of a demand letter, settlement, or
licensing deal.12 Indeed, the USPTO has issued hundreds of thousands
of patents each year for decades, but the number of patent lawsuits
per year during the same time period-and the number of patents
involved in those lawsuits-ranges in the thousands. 13 And while it is
difficult to calculate the number of other types of patent assertions
such as demand letters, settlements, and licensing deals because of
their non-public nature, there are good reasons to believe that their
numbers are few relative to the overall number of issued patents.1 4 In
other words, while this Article does not (and cannot's) define the total
number of patents that are asserted, it nonetheless remains true that
many-likely most-patents are never asserted in any manner. But if
patent trolls have been able to game the patent system for great gain
8 Grant Gross, FTC Will Target Patent Trolls, Commissioner Says, PCWORLD (Dec. 10,
2014, 1:35 PM), http://www.pcworld.com/article/2858392/ftc-will-target-patent-trolls-commission
er-says.html.
9 Jonathan Griffin, 2015 Patent Trolling Legislation, NAT'L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES
(June 15, 2016), http://www.ncsl.org/research/financial-services-and-commerce/2015-patent-trol
ling-legislation.aspx (indicating that twenty-seven states have enacted anti-patent troll
legislation).
10 The number of popular press articles on trolls is too large to list here. For a sampling of
such articles from just one popular technology news site, see Patent Trolls, WIRED, http://
www.wired.com/tag/patent-trolls/ (last visited May 31, 2017).
11 See, e.g., Patent Trolls and Patent Reform, STAN. L. SCH., https://law.stanford.edu/event/
patent-trolls-and-patent-reform/ (last visited May 31, 2017).
12 Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 Nw. U. L. REv. 1495, 1497,
1501-08 (2001) ("[Tlhe overwhelming majority of patents are never litigated or even licensed.");
Kimberly A. Moore, Worthless Patents, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1521, 1521-22 (2005) ("Each
year the United States Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) receives 350,000 patent applications
and grants approximately 180,000 patents. Despite the large number of patent grants annually,
patent holders file only 3,000 patent lawsuits involving approximately 4,500 patents each year to
enforce patents against infringers." (footnotes omitted)).
13 PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, 2016 PATENT LITIGATION STUDY: ARE WE AT AN IN-
FLECTION POINT? 1 (2016), http://www.pwc.com/us/en/forensic-services/publications/assets/ 2 016-
pwc-patent-litigation-study.pdf.
14 Lemley, supra note 12, at 1498, 1503.
15 To address this issue, some have called for a requirement that all license deals be regis-
tered as part of a national database. See id. at 1503 n.38. This proposal has never been imple-
mented, however. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING
PROCEDURE ch. 313 (2015), https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/mpep-0 3 0 0 .pdf (indi-




by systematically asserting patents, as many claim, 16 it may be surpris-
ing to find that so many patents remain on the sidelines. What, then,
accounts for this phenomenon of widespread patent non-assertion?
Previous scholarship has often assessed this question generally,
noting that the high costs of litigation, coupled with the low expected
value of recoverable damages, deters many parties from asserting
their rights.17 Other scholars have zeroed in on patent non-assertion in
particular, describing a related set of generic economic reasons for
why parties forego asserting their patents.18 For instance, asserting a
patent can be time consuming and costly, and is fraught with uncer-
tainty and risks.19 Furthermore, most patents may be of little actual
commercial value, even losing whatever value they have over time.20
In sum, in many-perhaps most-cases, the likely costs of asserting a
16 See Jennifer H. Wu & Jenny C. Wu, Giving Teeth to 35 U.S.C. § 285 to Award Attorneys'
Fees Against Vexatious Plaintiff Patentees, FED. LAw., Jan/Feb 2015, at 44, 46-47. See generally
EXEc. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, PATENT ASSERTION AND U.S. INNOVATION (2013), https://
obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/docs/patent-report.pdf.
17 See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, Private Versus Social Costs in Bringing Suit, 15 J. LEGAL STUD.
371, 371 (1986); Peter S. Menell, A Note on Private Versus Social Incentives to Sue in a Costly
Legal System, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 41, 41 (1983); Steven Shavell, The Fundamental Divergence
Between the Private and the Social Motive to Use the Legal System, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 575,
577-79 (1997) [hereinafter Shavell, Fundamental Divergence]; Steven Shavell, The Social Versus
the Private Incentive to Bring Suit in a Costly Legal System, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 333, 333-34
(1982); Tim Wu, Tolerated Use, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 617, 619 (2008).
18 See Lemley, supra note 12, at 1503 (showing that many issued patents are abandoned,
presumably because of their weak economic prospects); Robert P. Merges, As Many as Six Im-
possible Patents Before Breakfast: Property Rights for Business Concepts and Patent System Re-
form, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 577, 603 (1999) (concluding that most patented technologies fail
commercially and present few economic advantages).
19 Damon C. Andrews, Why Patentees Litigate, 12 CoLUM. Sa. & TECH. L. REV. 219,
223-38 (2011) (reviewing a variety of disincentives for patentees to assert their rights, including
the high costs of and "unpredictable results" of patent litigation); Jonathan M. Barnett, Property
as Process: How Innovation Markets Select Innovation Regimes, 119 YALE L.J. 384, 397 (2009)
(noting "that median patent discovery and litigation costs are $2.5 million and $4 million respec-
tively"); Christopher R. Leslie, The Anticompetitive Effects of Unenforced Invalid Patents, 91
MINN. L. REV. 101, 134-35 (2006) ("Uncertainty increases the deterrent effect of invalid patents
... because courts routinely make mistakes in patent litigation."); Kimberly A. Moore, Forum
Shopping in Patent Cases: Does Geographic Choice Affect Innovation?, 79 N.C. L. REV. 889,
908-09 (2001) (noting that the average length of patent litigation often exceeds a year).
20 Andrews, supra note 19, at 229-30; Edmund W. Kitch, Property Rights in Inventions,
Writings, and Marks, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 119, 122-23 (1990) (concluding that most
patents are so narrow that they are relatively worthless); Gideon Parchomovsky & R. Polk Wag-
ner, Patent Portfolios, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 5-6 (2005) ("The true value of patents inheres not in
their individual worth, but in their aggregation into a collection of related patents-a patent
portfolio.").
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patent outweigh the likely benefits, and patentees consequently
forego asserting their rights. 2 1
Yet while these economic considerations make a great deal of
sense, 2 2 they fail to account for patent non-assertion with the nuance it
deserves. Indeed, rational economic behavior in one context may be
entirely irrational in another, particularly because different industries
are subject to different economic influences. 23 Furthermore, clumping
together these disincentives to assert patents fails to account for how
these factors may interact and affect one another. Previous scholar-
ship explaining patent non-assertion is thus lacking in these several
key respects.
This Article attempts to address these gaps by assessing patent
non-assertion using an informal, industry-specific theoretical model. It
analyzes patent non-assertion in an industry-specific manner for sev-
eral reasons. First, though the requirements of patentability are more
or less uniform across industries, scholars have long argued that, in
reality, patents and patent law are industry specific. 2 4 In other words,
patents play different roles depending on the industry,25 and courts
often apply the requirements of patent law differently depending on
the implicated technology and industry. 26 Second, some industries, in
particular the pharmaceutical sector, include a regulatory overlay that
may significantly affect whether a party chooses to forego asserting its
patent rights.27
21 Andrews, supra note 19, at 248.
22 Paul Stancil, Balancing the Pleading Equation, 61 BAYLOR L. REV. 90, 93 (2009) ("U.S.
civil litigation is in many ways an inherently economic enterprise .... ).
23 See, e.g., Jay Berman & Janet Pfleeger, Which Industries Are Sensitive to Business Cy-
cles?, MONTHLY LAB. REV., Feb. 1997, at 19, 19 (discussing how different industries respond
differently to swings in business cycles, thereby suggesting that different industries are subject to
different economic models).
24 See DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND How THE COURTS
CAN SOLVE IT 62 (2009) (arguing that courts apply patent law differently depending on the
industry and advocating that courts should increase such tailoring to better realize the purposes
of patent law); Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Is Patent Law Technology-Specific?, 17 BERKE-
LEY TECH. L.J. 1155, 1205-06 (2002) (same); Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in
Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 1581-95 (2003) [hereinafter Burk & Lemley, Policy Levers]
(arguing that innovation is industry specific and that patent law should more readily adapt to
that reality).
25 JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: How JUDGES, BUREAU-
CRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 181-83 (2008) (arguing that the patent system
imposes more costs than benefits in most technology sectors).
26 See supra note 24.
27 See, e.g., Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Role of the FDA in Innovation Policy, 13 MICH.
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 345 (2007) (discussing the FDA's regulatory overlay and the role
of patents in the development of biomedical research); Richard A. Merrill, The Architecture of
[Vol. 85:645650
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As such, explaining patent non-assertion is almost certainly in-
dustry specific as well. Different costs and risks arise depending on the
industry, and those differences matter in terms of theorizing whether
and why a particular patent owner will forego asserting its rights. This
Article first charts out some of these different costs and how they may
interact, thereby building a model for assessing patent non-assertion
across different industries. It then applies this model to four specific
industries: software, pharmaceuticals, biotechnology, and semiconduc-
tors. Scholars often focus on these industries because of their overall
importance to the economy, 28 and this Article uses them as case stud-
ies for similar reasons.
Of course, it is important to stress at the outset that industries-
and patents and parties within them-are also not monolithic. 29 In the
information technology industry, for instance, Facebook likely faces
different costs and benefits in asserting its patents than, say, a start-up
or patent troll in the same sector. Furthermore, different parties
within an industry may possess different types of patents in terms of
quality and quantity that may also affect whether they choose to assert
their patents.3 0
Nonetheless, though no theory can capture all relevant nuances,31
an industry-specific theoretical model has several advantages. First, it
allows for identification of broader trends within industries that previ-
ous studies of patent non-assertion have failed to account for. And
second, an industry-specific model provides a useful theoretical basis
for further studies of specific industries and the different factors that
affect how parties within those industries act, with respect to patents
and otherwise.
Overall, this Article's industry-specific theoretical model finds
that disincentives to patent assertion are particularly high in the
software industry. The semiconductor industry similarly exhibits
strong disincentives to patent assertion, though typically not as high as
Government Regulation of Medical Products, 82 VA. L. REV. 1753 (1996) (providing an overview
of how the FDA regulates medical products).
28 Benjamin M. Roin, The Case for Tailoring Patent Awards Based on Time-to-Market, 61
UCLA L. REV. 672, 687 (2014).
29 See, e.g., W. Nicholson Price II, Big Data, Patents, and the Future of Medicine, 37 CAR-
DOzo L. REV. 1401, 1452-53 (2016) (stressing that the pharmaceutical industry is not uniform in
terms of the role of patents).
30 See, e.g., Jonathan H. Ashtor, Michael J. Mazzeo & Samantha Zyontz, Patents at Issue:
The Data Behind the Patent Troll Debate, 21 GEO. MASON L. REV. 957, 969 (2014) (assessing the
quality of patents asserted by patent trolls vis-A-vis those of manufacturing companies).
31 See generally KENNETH N. WALTZ, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITIcs 7 (1979) (ar-
guing that "[a] full description would be of least explanatory power" in modeling a theory).
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in the software industry. In the pharmaceutical industry, conversely,
disincentives to patent assertion are relatively low; instead, incentives
to assert pharmaceutical patents are typically high. The biotechnology
industry similarly demonstrates relatively weak disincentives to patent
assertion, though for a variety of reasons explored infra, incentives to
assert patents in the biotechnology industry may not be as strong as
they once were.
Importantly, these findings have implications for recent judicial
and legislative patent law changes, many of which aim to curb exces-
sive patent assertions by so-called patent trolls. Ironically, this Article
finds that high barriers to patent assertion in an industry may actually
increase patent assertions in the industry. This is so because those high
barriers can make patent assertion too costly and risky for the patent
holder, at which point many patent holders outsource those costs to
patent trolls by selling or licensing to them some or all of their pat-
ents. Or in other cases, the high costs may help push a company to
become a patent assertion entity itself as it seeks economies of scale in
patent litigation.32 And once either of these scenarios plays out, patent
assertions are likely to rise, since the adopted business model de-
mands it.
This, in fact, seems to be what has happened in the software in-
dustry: while the industry generally exhibits high barriers to patent
assertion, it has simultaneously seen an explosion in patent assertions
over the last decade. And much of that explosion is attributable to
patent trolling. 33 This Article thus contends that high barriers to pat-
ent assertion in the software industry help explain, in part, the rise in
patent assertions in the industry. This industry-specific analysis, there-
fore, may also help identify other industries that are increasingly at
risk of increased patent trolling should barriers to patent assertion be-
come too high. As this Article will explore, the biotechnology and
semiconductor industries may be two such industries.
This Article has four parts. Part I provides a brief overview of the
predominant theories behind patent law to highlight how these theo-
ries predict how patent holders will act in the face of potential in-
fringements of their rights. These theories suggest that, all else being
equal, patent holders will assert their rights in the face of potential
infringement. Part II then contrasts these theories with the reality that
most patent rights are never asserted, even in cases where they could
32 See Kristen Osenga, Formerly Manufacturing Entities: Piercing the "Patent Troll" Rheto-
ric, 47 CONN. L. REv. 435, 467-68 (2014).
33 See infra Section III.A.
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be. In reviewing some of the basic economic rationales that help ex-
plain this phenomenon, this Part builds a taxonomy of different disin-
centives to patent assertion. Part III applies this taxonomy to four
specific industries: software, pharmaceuticals, biotechnology, and
semiconductors. This application shows that the different disincentives
to patent assertion play out differently depending on the industry.
This Part also shows that these different categories of disincentives
often have a dynamic relationship, meaning that the presence of one
type of disincentive may increase or decrease the presence of another.
Finally, Part IV assesses some potential implications of these industry-
specific disincentives to patent assertion, including the claim that high
barriers to patent assertion in an industry may ironically result in in-
creased patent assertions in that industry.
I. THE THEORIES BEHIND PATENTS
The U.S. Constitution authorizes Congress to grant inventors
with exclusive rights in their discoveries in order to "promote the Pro-
gress of Science and the useful Arts." 34 On the basis of this provision,
Congress has enacted patent laws.3 5 Patent laws grant exclusive rights
to qualifying inventors for their "discoveries." 3 6 According to the
dominant theory behind patent rights, these exclusive rights are neces-
sary because without them, inventors would have insufficient eco-
nomic incentives to engage in socially beneficial inventive behavior. 37
This is so, the story goes, because intellectual products such as
inventive ideas have the features of public goods: they are non-
rivalrous, meaning one party's use of the product does not prevent
another from using the same, and they are non-excludable, meaning
that it is difficult to prevent others from using such intellectual prod-
ucts.38 Consequently, absent rights of exclusion under patent law, third
parties could replicate the intellectual products of others without in-
curring the same costs. 39 Inventive parties would thus not create them
for fear of this happening. With rights of exclusion in hand, con-
34 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
35 See Dotan Oliar, The (Constitutional) Convention on IP: A New Reading, 57 UCLA L.
REV. 421, 463-64 (2009).
36 Id. at 458, 463.
37 Mark A. Lemley, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Justifications for Intellectual Property, 71 U.
CHI. L. REV. 129, 129-30 (2004) (articulating this rationale); Henry E. Smith, Intellectual Prop-
erty as Property: Delineating Entitlements in Information, 116 YALE L.J. 1742, 1744-45 (2007).
38 See ROBERT P. MERGES, PETER S. MENELL & MARK A. LEMLEY, INTELLECTUAL PROP-
ERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 2 (6th ed. 2012).
39 Id. at 11-17.
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versely, inventive parties have the right economic incentives to invent
because those rights allow them to exclude others from free-riding on
their inventive ideas.4 0
To illustrate this theory in practice: a pharmaceutical company
may not invest the millions of dollars it takes to develop life-saving
drugs if it were true that another party could replicate the drug with-
out incurring the same costs as-or any liability to-the pharmaceuti-
cal company. 41 And when third parties attempt to use the products of
pharmaceutical companies without permission, we have plenty of evi-
dence of pharmaceutical companies protecting their investments by
asserting their patent rights in pharmaceutical products. 42
Hence, an important part of this economic incentives story is that
we would expect rights holders to assert their rights in cases where
doing so helps protect their investments in creating the intellectual
products. And we might expect this to be so in most cases because, all
else being equal, third parties would otherwise free-ride on the efforts
of the rights holders. That free-riding problem, after all, is precisely
the problem patents are meant to solve.4 3
Of course, a variety of other economic considerations may affect
whether a party ultimately chooses to assert its rights; Part II will ex-
amine those considerations in detail.4 4 For now, suffice it to say that
the basic economic reasoning of the dominant theory behind patent
rights would appear to predict some form of patent assertion when
infringement occurs.
Aside from this dominant "utilitarian" model, other important in-
tellectual property law theories also appear to predict that patent
owners will assert their rights when third parties infringe those rights.
For instance, "prospect" and "commercialization" theories of patent
40 Id.
41 Indeed, the pharmaceutical industry is often pointed to as one of the areas where this
theory applies well. See, e.g., Price, supra note 29, at 1452 (noting that "[t]he pharmaceutical and
biomedical industries are typically characterized as areas where patents work fairly well" be-
cause these industries require substantial upfront investment, and patent rights help recoup
those investments).
42 Indeed, because pharmaceutical companies "protect the intellectual property (IP) that
drugs represent and sue those who try to manufacture and sell patented drugs cheaply," some
regard pharmaceutical companies as "vampires who exploit the sick and ignore the sufferings of
the poor." The New Drugs War, ECoNOMIsT (Jan. 4, 2014), http://www.economist.com/news/
leaders/21592619-patents-drugs-are-interests-sick-well-industry-protection-should-not.
43 See Joseph Scott Miller, Building a Better Bounty: Litigation-Stage Rewards for Defeat-
ing Patents, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 667, 680-85 (2004) (describing this theory in the patent
context).
44 See infra Part II.
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law argue that we grant patent rights in order to incentivize inventors
to further develop and commercialize their inventions. 45 These types
of "ex-post" theories thus focus on the post-invention incentives of
parties, and theorize that granting parties rights in their inventions, if
done correctly, will incentivize those parties to cultivate their inven-
tions for the benefit of society.46 Another group of theories, what
some call "disclosure" or "coordination" theories, similarly focuses on
the post-invention incentives of creators, positing that parties will be
averse to sharing their technological accomplishments with others
without rights of exclusion in hand.47 This is so because, without exclu-
sive rights, inventors fear they will lose the economic value of their
inventions, while others will capture that value.4 8
Hence, if these theories hold true, we would also expect rights
holders to assert their patent rights against infringers. Otherwise, such
infringements would significantly undermine the incentives of patent
owners to further develop their inventions, or to disclose their inven-
tions to third parties or the public in general. For instance, a third
party using some patented technology without a license from the rele-
vant patent owner would harm that patent owner's economic pros-
pects in several ways. First, the patent owner loses an economic
opportunity vis-A-vis that third party. Second, the patent owner may
lose economic opportunities more broadly, either because other par-
45 See, e.g., Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. &
ECON. 265 (1977) (articulating "prospect" theory). For "commercialization" theory accounts, see
Michael Abramowicz, The Danger of Underdeveloped Patent Prospects, 92 CORNELL L. REV.
1065 (2007); Michael Abramowicz & John F. Duffy, Intellectual Property for Market Experimen-
tation, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 337 (2008); F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights and Property Rules for
Commercializing Inventions, 85 MINN. L. REV. 697 (2001); Ted Sichelman, Commercializing Pat-
ents, 62 STAN. L. REV. 341 (2010).
46 See Lemley, supra note 37, at 130; supra note 45.
47 See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF IN-
TELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAw 326-30 (2003) (elaborating on the coordination function and value
of patents); Paul J. Heald, A Transaction Costs Theory of Patent Law, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 473,
488-89, 497 (2005) (arguing that patents help address concerns about information misappropria-
tion and thus encourage information sharing); Roberto Mazzoleni & Richard R. Nelson, Eco-
nomic Theories About the Benefits and Costs of Patents, 32 J. ECON. ISSUES 1031, 1039-40 (1998)
(describing different strands of disclosure theory generally); Stephen Yelderman, Coordination-
Focused Patent Policy, 96 B.U. L. REV. 1565 (2016).
48 See, e.g., Nancy T. Gallini, The Economics of Patents: Lessons from Recent U.S. Patent
Reform, 16 J. ECON. PERSP. 131, 132 (2002) (suggesting that patents may induce parties to dis-
close information that they may otherwise withhold); Robert P. Merges, A Transactional View of
Property Rights, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1477, 1487-90 (2005) (describing how property rights,
including patent rights, may induce parties to disclose information before, during, and after con-
tract formation that they otherwise may withhold for fear that the value of their property will be
lost).
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ties choose to obtain the patented technology from the original in-
fringer rather than the patent owner, or these other parties may
simply develop the technology themselves. Of course, the patent
owner may at that point choose to assert its patent rights against any
and all of these parties. But if they did so, that would simply confirm
the expectation that, in accordance with these theories, patent owners
will assert their rights against infringers in order to vindicate their eco-
nomic interests in developing or sharing the patented technologies
more broadly.
In contrast to these economic-centric theories, "natural rights"
theories may, at first glance, seem less straightforward in terms of pre-
dicting that rights holders will assert their rights against potential in-
fringers of those rights. Natural rights theories posit that we grant
patents for a variety of reasons that are not strictly economic in na-
ture.49 For instance, we might grant parties rights in what they have
created on the basis of their efforts, or the "labor" that they exerted in
creating the intellectual product.5 0 We might also grant rights to par-
ties in their inventions because those inventions are bound up in the
personality or "personhood" of the creator.51
Hence, if patent rights arise because of a creator's personhood or
labor, the economic incentives to sue infringers may not exist because
the intellectual activity was never entirely about economics in the first
place. But in reality, these types of theories, when and if they apply,
may in some cases actually predict greater rights assertions than their
economic counterparts discussed above. This is so because, if rights
accrue due to the inventor's effort or "personhood," use of that crea-
tion without permission may represent in some sense a personal viola-
tion. And in many cases, a personal affront of this nature may be more
likely to trigger an attempt by rights holders to vindicate their inter-
ests than if the right is simply economic in nature.52
49 Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism in
the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533, 1535, 1560 (1993).
50 See, e.g., id.; Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287,
296-330 (1988) (discussing different interpretations of Lockean property theory and how reward
schemes interact with labor output).
51 See, e.g., Neil Netanel, Copyright Alienability Restrictions and the Enhancement of Au-
thor Autonomy: A Normative Evaluation, 24 RUTGERs L.J. 347, 423 (1993); Margaret Jane Ra-
din, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 957 (1982).
52 Christopher Buccafusco & David Fagundes, The Moral Psychology of Copyright In-
fringement, 100 MINN. L. REV. 2433, 2483-84 (2016) (reviewing a number of psychological rea-




In sum, the predominant theories behind patent rights appear to
suggest that patent holders will typically assert their rights when third
parties violate them. And of course, plenty of examples exist where
rights holders do exactly that. Indeed, as discussed in the Introduction,
there is growing concern that many rights holders actually assert their
rights in excess, in ways that harm society and sully intellectual prop-
erty laws more generally.53
Yet the reality is that most patents are never asserted, or at least
are asserted less than they could be.54 In light of the predominant the-
ories behind patent law, this is a curious result, because many of these
theories argue that patent rights are necessary incentives to inventive
and other socially beneficial behavior. Hence, implicit in such theories
is that rights holders will vindicate those interests when parties, such
as infringers, act to undermine them. The next Part explores reasons
why these theories may often not match reality.
II. THE REASONS BEHIND PATENT NON-ASSERTION
This Part examines various reasons why patent holders may
choose to forego asserting their rights, even in cases where they
clearly could assert those rights, and where dominant patent theories
suggest that they would. Section II.A argues one reason is that the
theories reviewed above may simply be incomplete in many cases.
Section II.B momentarily sets aside that possibility and takes the pre-
dominant theories at face value, instead exploring a variety of reasons
why patent holders don't assert their rights more than they do.
A. Theoretical Incompleteness
One reason why parties may not assert their patents in situations
where dominant theories predict that they would is, quite simply, that
the theories may not always accurately explain the role of patents. In
other words, the widespread phenomenon of patent non-assertion
may simply be evidence of the incompleteness, in many cases, of pre-
dominant patent law theories.
Indeed, a substantial body of scholarship has grown over the
years challenging the traditional premises of many of these theories.
One line of critique is that intellectual property rights are not the only,
53 See, e.g., Jeanne C. Fromer, Should the Law Care Why Intellectual Property Rights Have
Been Asserted?, 53 Hous. L. REV. 549, 587-92 (2015) (arguing that assertions of intellectual
property rights that do not align with the purposes behind those laws can cause greater societal
losses than the laws intended).
54 See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
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or even the most important, incentives that promote inventive behav-
ior.5 5 Tax incentives, government grants and prizes, and other regula-
tory measures also provide incentives for such behavior. 5 6 And in
some cases, they may be better mechanisms than patent rights for pro-
moting creativity and invention.57 Hence, non-assertion of rights may
result in some cases because these other incentives are the real drivers
behind many inventive activities, and vindication of patent rights is,
consequently, simply less important than imagined.
Second, in a growing literature often referred to as "IP without
IP," scholars point to a number of areas where creativity and innova-
tion have flourished absent any intellectual property protections at
all.58 Other factors, such as social norms, competition, or the love of
creativity itself, appear to motivate parties to innovate even absent
formal intellectual property protections.59 Hence, this evidence may
suggest that intellectual property rights are less needed than imagined,
or in some cases not needed at all, even in areas of intellectual activity
where intellectual property rights apply.60 And if intellectual property
rights such as patents sometimes do not act as incentives in the ways
that traditional intellectual property law theories posit, then it may be
less surprising that violation of those rights does not result in more
frequent rights assertions.
Third and relatedly, although patents may have an important role
to play, in many cases the roles may be different than those that tradi-
tional theories ascribe to them. For instance, some scholarship argues
that parties sometimes obtain patents in order to signal information to
55 See, e.g., Daniel J. Hemel & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Beyond the Patents-Prizes De-
bate, 92 TEX. L. REV. 303 (2013) (arguing for a "pluralistic approach" to innovation policy be-
cause tax incentives and government grants can stimulate innovative behavior with greater effect
than patents in certain areas); Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Patentable Subject Matter and Nonpat-
ent Innovation Incentives, 5 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 1115 (2015).
56 Ouellette, supra note 55, at 1130.
57 See Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 55, at 303.
58 See, e.g., KAL RAUSTIALA & CHRISTOPHER SPRIGMAN, THE KNOCKOFF ECONOMY:
How IMITATION SPARKS INNOVATION 5 (2012); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Does IP Need IP?
Accommodating Intellectual Production Outside the Intellectual Property Paradigm, 31 CARDOZO
L. REv. 1437, 1437, 1446 (2010); Kal Raustiala & Christopher Sprigman, The Piracy Paradox:
Innovation and Intellectual Property in Fashion Design, 92 VA. L. REv. 1687, 1689-91 (2006);
Elizabeth L. Rosenblatt, A Theory of IP's Negative Space, 34 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 317, 319-21
(2011).
59 See supra note 58.
60 See, e.g., Anthony J. Casey & Andres Sawicki, The Problem of Creative Collaboration,
58 Wm. & MARY L. REV. (forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 3-4), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract id=2772710 (arguing that informal rules are often more effective and im-
portant in facilitating creative collaboration than formal copyright law).
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capital, product, and labor markets about the patent holder.61 Hence,
rather than using patents as means by which to directly recoup their
costs, parties may use patents to attract venture financing, recruit tal-
ented employees, and facilitate collaboration more generally. 62 As
such, patent holders using patents in these ways may lack good rea-
sons to assert some or all of their patents. In fact, in some cases they
may even have very good reasons to formally forego asserting their
rights.63
These pushbacks to traditional intellectual property law theories
are certainly plausible in many cases, and may explain in some settings
why parties forego asserting their rights in the face of infringement. In
other words, patent rights simply may not be important to many pat-
ent holders-at least in the ways that traditional patent law theories
posit.64 Widespread patent non-assertion may thus provide additional
evidence that traditional patent law theories are often incomplete ex-
planations of the roles that patents play.
But other economic factors may help explain such non-assertion
as well. Indeed, parties may choose to forego asserting their rights
against infringers because of such factors, even in cases where the
premises of traditional patent law theories accurately explain the role
of patents in incentivizing patent holders. The following Sections mo-
mentarily take predominant patent law theories at face value and seek
to explain, on the basis of certain economic factors, why parties may
forego asserting their rights in the face of infringement.
B. Economic Disincentives
Part I painted a fairly basic economic picture in suggesting that,
under the predominant economic theories behind patent rights, rights
holders would be expected to assert their rights in the face of infringe-
ment, all else being equal. But it is clear that in many cases, all else is
not equal.
61 See Clark D. Asay, The Informational Value of Patents, 31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 259,
265 (2016) (arguing that patent holders that pledge their patents to the public do so in many
cases in order to credibly signal information about themselves to capital, labor, and product
markets); Clarisa Long, Patent Signals, 69 U. CH. L. REV. 625, 636-37 (2002).
62 See supra note 61.
63 Asay, supra note 61, at 300, 304 (discussing a variety of patent pledges made by patent
owners where such parties formally and publicly pledge to forego asserting their rights against
third parties).
64 Cf Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Patent Experimentalism, 101 VA. L. REV. 65, 69 (2015)
(arguing for policy diversity with respect to innovation policy more generally).
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Indeed, scholars have long noted a number of general economic
considerations that may lead any given party with a colorable legal
claim to forego making that claim.6 5 For instance, in many cases the
private benefits of bringing a suit are simply too few, particularly since
the legal system "is a very costly social institution" and potential liti-
gants may not realize many of the benefits of their suits (e.g., such as
deterring future wrongs from others). 6 6 Indeed, the high costs of litiga-
tion, coupled with the low expected value of recoverable damages,
may deter many parties from pursuing lawsuits. 67 The result in many
cases may be too few incentives for parties to assert claims that may
otherwise benefit society.68 Or as one scholar put it, such factors often
lead to "systematic underenforcement of otherwise actionable claims"
in legal regimes, such as the patent system, that rely on private
enforcement. 6 9
Patents may be particularly prone to underenforcement for a
number of additional reasons. First, many-perhaps most-patents
may simply lack significant commercial worth, even losing whatever
value they have over time.70 Indeed, several scholars suggest that most
patents, in isolation, are of extremely limited value.7 1 Hence, even if a
patentee wins a patent infringement suit or otherwise successfully as-
serts its patents against a third party, any damages or licensing fees
that the party obtains may be relatively small, particularly in light of
65 See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
66 Shavell, Fundamental Divergence, supra note 17, at 575-78.
67 Menell, supra note 17, at 41.
68 Shavell, Fundamental Divergence, supra note 17, at 578; see also Mark A. Lemley, The
Surprising Resilience of the Patent System, 95 TEX. L. REV. 1, 2 (2016) (discussing the possibility
of a "crisis of underprotection" because of patent law reforms that have weakened patent
rights).
69 Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Uneasy Case Against Copyright Trolls, 86 S. CAL. L.
REV. 723, 729 (2013).
70 Andrews, supra note 19, at 229-30; Kitch, supra note 20, at 122-23 (concluding that
most patents are so narrow that they are relatively worthless); Lemley, supra note 12, at 1503-06
(showing that many issued patents are abandoned, presumably because of their weak economic
prospects); Merges, supra note 18, at 603 (concluding that most patented technologies fail com-
mercially and present few economic advantages).
71 See F.M. Scherer, The Innovation Lottery, in EXPANDING THE BOUNDARIES OF INTEL-
LECTUAL PROPERTY: INNOVATION POLICY FOR THE KNOwLEDGE SOCIETY 3, 3-21 (Rochelle
Cooper Dreyfuss et al. eds., 2001) (arguing that the hope of winning a patent "lottery" encour-
ages many parties to obtain patents that do not end up proving valuable, and which are thus
never enforced); John R. Allison et al., Valuable Patents, 92 GEO. L.J. 435, 436-37 (2004) ("The
best explanation for why some patents are used and others are not is simple: Some patents are
intrinsically more valuable than others."); Parchomovsky & Wagner, supra note 20, at 5-6 ("The
true value of patents inheres not in their individual worth, but in their aggregation into a collec-
tion of related patents-a patent portfolio."); see also supra note 70.
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the high costs of making the assertion in the first place.72 Thus, the
lack of significant value associated with any given patent may be
enough, on its own, to deter many patent assertions.
Second, even if a given patent has some value, asserting it may be
unappealing because the initial costs of making that determination are
so high. That is, in order to assert their patents against third parties,
patent holders must first do several things. For starters, they must in-
cur the (often significant) costs associated with evaluating their own
patent portfolios to identify patents that have more than marginal
value and that are likely infringed.73 Conducting such evaluations may
include enlisting both internal resources-such as engineers, in-house
counsel, and business personnel-as well as outside counsel and other
analytics expertise. 7 4
Once a patent holder evaluates its patent portfolio, the patent
holder must then identify and assess actual instances of potential in-
fringement.75 Doing so can be time consuming and difficult as well,
since not all instances of patent infringement are readily observable. 7 6
Furthermore, even once a party has identified a potential target, it
may incur additional search costs in evaluating the strength of poten-
tial counterclaims.77 Indeed, this phase will also likely require using
72 See infra Part III.
73 See, e.g., Michael Gulliford, Sound Patent Portfolio Management Is the Key to Innova-
tion Success, IPWATCHDOG (Nov. 1, 2015), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2015/11/01/sound-pat-
ent-portfolio-management-key-innovation-successid=62674/ ("[M]any innovative companies
have no idea what is actually in their patent portfolio.").
74 It may seem surprising that parties spend so many resources acquiring patents, only to
lose track of them internally. Indeed, the costs of patent acquisition can be significant, and only
increase in absolute terms the more patents a party acquires. See Gene Quinn, The Cost of
Obtaining a Patent in the US, IPWATCHDOG (Apr. 4, 2015), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2015/04/
04/the-cost-of-obtaining-a-patent-in-the-usid=56485/ (detailing ballpark figures for obtaining
different types of patents, which in the cumulative typically cost at least $10,000 per patent). Be
that as it may, it is common for parties to lack rigorous patent portfolio management. See Gul-
liford, supra note 73. Consequently, the costs of assessing one's patents can be high, and those
costs may deter many patent assertions that would otherwise make commercial sense.
75 Tun-Jen Chiang, The Reciprocity of Search, 66 VAND. L. REv. 1, 2-4, 39-40 (2013) (ar-
guing that patent law currently imposes too few obligations on patentees to search for potential
infringers); Jonathan S. Masur, Patent Liability Rules as Search Rules, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 187,
187-88 (2011) (discussing the search costs that patentees may face when seeking out potential
infringers).
76 See, e.g., Julia Elvidge, Using Reverse Engineering to Discover Patent Infringement,
PHOTONICS MEDIA (Sept. 2010), http://www.photonics.com/Article.aspx?AID=44063 (discussing
the need in many cases to use reverse engineering to discover patent infringement, since many
instances of patent infringement may not be otherwise readily observable).
77 Kayla Fossen, Note, The Post-Grant Problem: America Invents Falling Short, 14 MINN.
J.L. Sci. & TECH. 573, 593 (2013) ("[T]here is an institutional bias in the United States for
counterclaims.").
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both internal and external resources to identify and evaluate potential
targets, all of which can be costly.78 In the cumulative, these types of
search costs may thus be significant enough to deter many patent as-
sertions, even in cases where the patents otherwise have more than
marginal value.
Third, even if a party overcomes these search costs, moving ahead
with a patent assertion entails additional, potentially significant nego-
tiation costs. For starters, even if a party does not formally file a pat-
ent suit, asserting a patent against a third party involves costs
associated with making the assertion, such as initially approaching the
party and negotiating with them thereafter. And these negotiation
costs can quickly grow, especially if negotiations become protracted
and ultimately result in the need to prepare complex legal documents
relating to a settlement or licensing deal.7 9
Indeed, these negotiations may become particularly complex,
time consuming, and costly in cases where the original asserter wakes
a sleeping dragon. In other words, the asserted-against party may own
patents of its own that it can bring to bear against the original asserter.
Hence, patent owners that practice a variety of inventive ideas in their
day-to-day commercial operations may be more loathe to assert pat-
ents against others, simply for fear that those parties will strike back
with patent claims of their own and thereby increase the costs of nego-
tiating an end to the original assertion.80
Fourth, a patent asserter may incur significant litigation costs re-
lated to formally asserting a patent in court. A party may ultimately
file a patent infringement suit against a third-party infringer for sev-
eral reasons. First, they may do so to increase their leverage vis-a-vis
the other party in licensing and settlement negotiations." Second,
they may file a patent infringement suit because licensing and settle-
ment negotiations have broken down, and litigation is their final re-
sort.8 2 Finally, the patent owner may file a patent infringement suit
78 See Gulliford, supra note 73.
79 See, e.g., Gene Quinn, Drafting a Licensing Agreement, a Patentee Perspective,
IPWATCHDOG (Apr. 30, 2016), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2016/04/30/drafting-licensing-agree
ment/id=68723/ (discussing some of the complexities of negotiating a patent license, which leads
to many of these negotiation costs).
80 Bessen & Meurer, supra note 4, at 413 (noting that non-practicing entities ("NPEs"),
also known as patent trolls, "have a bargaining advantage over practicing-entity patent plaintiffs
because NPEs are invulnerable to patent counterclaims and have lower litigation costs, espe-
cially discovery costs").
81 Andrews, supra note 19, at 240.
82 Id. at 248-49.
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because they prefer patent law remedies, such as potential injunctive
relief, to those they are able to privately negotiate. 83
But patent litigation is notoriously expensive. 84 Indeed, average
costs for litigating a patent range in the millions of dollars.85 These
high costs also mean that patent litigation can last a long time, thereby
consuming time and resources that the patent owner might otherwise
devote to other important interests.86 Furthermore, many of the nego-
tiation costs discussed above also typically become part of the litiga-
tion, as parties often spend significant resources during litigation
attempting to settle their dispute, not to mention also responding to
counterclaims. 7 Hence, the high costs of litigation, too, can often act
as a deterrent to many parties asserting their patents,8 since a party
considering patent assertion must be prepared for the possibility that
it may need to ultimately resort to the courts to settle its dispute.
Fifth, asserting a patent can also entail what this Article refers to
as invalidity costs. That is, if a patent holder asserts its patents against
a third party, the asserted patents may ultimately be invalidated, and
the patent holder thereby forfeits patent assets against the world. 89
This can happen on the basis of a number of substantive patent law
doctrines, including a failure to satisfy patent law's novelty, non-obvi-
ousness, patentable-subject matter, utility, or disclosure
requirements. 90
It can also happen in a number of different settings. For instance,
if a patent holder asserts its patents against a party outside of court,
the asserted-against party can appeal to a court seeking a declaratory
83 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 283-284 (2012) (providing remedies such as injunctive relief and mone-
tary damages).
84 See Andrews, supra note 19, at 226-38 (reviewing a variety of disincentives for paten-
tees to assert their rights, including the high costs of such litigation); Barnett, supra note 19, at
398.
85 See AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAw Ass'N, REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 2005 22
(2005) (indicating that the median expense for a patent litigation with more than $25 million at
risk was $4.5 million); Aaron S. Kesselheim & Jonathan J. Darrow, Hatch-Waxman Turns 30: Do
We Need a Re-Designed Approach for the Modern Era?, 15 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHICS
293, 324 (2015); Chris Neumeyer, Managing Costs of Patent Litigation, IPWATCHDOG (Feb. 5,
2013), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2013/02/05/managing-costs-of-patent-litigation/id=34808.
86 Moore, supra note 19, at 908 (noting that the average length of patent litigation often
exceeds a year).
87 See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
88 Barnett, supra note 19, at 398.
89 See Roger Allan Ford, Patent Invalidity Versus Noninfringement, 99 CORNELL L. REV.
71, 77-78, 78 n.21 (2013).
90 Id.
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judgment that the patent is invalid.91 Furthermore, if a patent holder
asserts its patents against a party in court, that party is likely to defend
against the assertion, in part, by claiming that the patent is invalid.92 In
either case, if a court finds that the patents are invalid, that invalidity
affects not only the instant dispute, but also means that the patent
owner loses rights against the rest of the world, including potential
licensing opportunities.9 3 Moreover, if a court finds that the patent
owner engaged in "inequitable conduct" in procuring the patent, such
a finding could mean that other, related patents are also no longer
enforceable. 9 4
In addition to these traditional court options, the 2011 America
Invents Act 95 (said to be the most important patent law reform in
some sixty years) also instituted a number of patent validity review
procedures that third parties can use to invalidate patents, even absent
any sort of patent controversy between the parties.96 Nonetheless, a
patent assertion, in or outside of court, may make it more likely that
defendants resort to these expedited review mechanisms as well. 97
In all of these settings, the risk that a patent asserter will incur
invalidity costs is relatively high for several reasons. First, it may be
true that many, and perhaps most, patents are actually invalid.98 In-
deed, scholars have long complained that the USPTO harms society
by flooding the marketplace with significant numbers of invalid pat-
ents.99 If this is true, then there's simply a good chance that the as-
91 See, e.g., Jennifer R. Saionz, Declaratory Judgment Actions in Patent Cases: The Federal
Circuit's Response to MedImmune v. Genetech, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 161, 168-69 (2008)
(discussing several cases involving a finding of invalidity based on an action for declaratory
judgment).
92 But for reasons why a defendant may rely on non-infringement as a defense over inva-
lidity, see Ford, supra note 89, at 85.
93 See Andrews, supra note 19, at 233.
94 Lee Petherbridge, Jason Rantanen & R. Polk Wagner, Unenforceability, 70 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 1751, 1752-54 (2013).
95 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 19, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (codi-
fied as amended in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.).
96 See generally Eric C. Cohen, A Primer on Inter Partes Review, Covered Business Method
Review, and Post-Grant Review Before the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, 24 FED. CIR. B.J. 1
(2014) (discussing three "fast-track proceedings for challenging issued patents" under the
America Invents Act).
97 See, e.g., Brian J. Love & Shawn Ambwani, Inter Partes Review: An Early Look at the
Numbers, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 93, 94 (2014) (providing statistics relating to inter
partes review, a new mechanism within patent law for reviewing the validity of patents).
98 Alan Devlin, Antitrust Limits on Targeted Patent Aggregation, 67 FLA. L. REV. 775, 779
(2015).
99 Michael D. Frakes & Melissa F. Wasserman, Does the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
Grant Too Many Bad Patents?: Evidence from a Quasi-Experiment, 67 STAN. L. REV. 613, 615
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serted patents are actually invalid, and that a court or other tribunal
will accordingly reach that conclusion.
Second, even if the asserted patents are valid, the judge or jury
may misunderstand both the law and the implicated technologies in a
way that results in an invalidity finding. This risk stems in part from
the fact that patent law is highly technical, and the implicated technol-
ogies are often quite complicated.100 And there is some evidence that
courts misapply patent law with some frequency.101 Of course, it is also
possible that courts may often misunderstand patent law and the im-
plicated technologies in ways that favor the patent holder. But courts
and other tribunals that assess the validity of patents routinely find
them invalid.10 2 This pattern might simply support the widespread be-
lief that most patents are, in fact, invalid. But it could also be evidence
that courts are more typically biased against patent holders in misap-
plying patent law and misunderstanding the implicated technologies.
Hence, while high invalidation rates in general do not mean that any
given patent owner's patent will face a similar fate, those high invali-
dation rates nonetheless highlight the very real risks that patent as-
serters will incur invalidity costs if they decide to assert their patents.
Sixth and finally, patent owners may face significant reputational
costs when asserting patents. For instance, a pharmaceutical company
that asserts its patents against a nonprofit entity for providing the
pharmaceutical company's patented drug in developing countries may
draw the public's ire.103 Furthermore, patent owners that assert their
patents against competitors are increasingly labeled derisively in the
press and otherwise, for seemingly no other reason than the fact that
(2015) ("Many believe the root cause of the patent system's dysfunction is that the U.S. Patent
and Trademark Office (PTO or Agency) is issuing too many invalid patents that unnecessarily
drain consumer welfare, stunt productive research, and unreasonably extract rents from
innovators.").
100 See Kimberly A. Moore, Are District Court Judges Equipped to Resolve Patent Cases?,
15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 3 (2001).
101 Id. (presenting the results of an empirical study showing that district court judges mis-
construe what patents cover one-third of the time).
102 See, e.g., John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of
Litigated Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 205-06 (1998) (finding that nearly half of patents litigated
on the issue of validity were found invalid); Love & Ambwani, supra note 97, at 93-94 (provid-
ing statistics relating to inter partes review, a new mechanism within patent law for reviewing the
validity of patents).
103 See, e.g., Marius Meland, Abbott Labs Sued by Activists over AIDS Drug Patents,
LAw360 (Dec. 2, 2005, 12:00 AM), http://www.1aw360.com/articles/4659/abbott-labs-sued-by-ac
tivists-over-aids-drug-patents (detailing the ire that Abbott Labs' AIDS drug patents have
drawn, including attempts to invalidate the patents in Brazil).
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they asserted their patents against those competitors. 1 0 4 Indeed, par-
ties increasingly use the pejorative "patent troll" term not only to de-
scribe parties that assert patents as their primary commercial activity,
but to describe parties asserting their patents against competitors as
well.1 0 5 And when patent holders take hits to their reputation on the
basis of patent assertions, they may lose support in capital, labor, and
product markets.106
In sum, these different costs cumulatively mean that in many-
perhaps most-cases, the likely costs of asserting a patent outweigh
the likely benefits. As a result, many patentees are likely to forego
asserting their rights in a wide range of situations, even in cases where
they could, and where the predominant theories behind patent law
seem to predict that they would. 0 7 Table 1 below summarizes these
factors in table format. Following Table 1, Part III turns to applying
this taxonomy to different industries to show that these disincentives
to patent assertion play out differently from one industry to the next.
TABLE 1. TAXONOMY OF DISINCENTIVES TO PATENT ASSERTION
Factor Examples
Value of Patent(s) Patent(s) may have limited
commercial value, resulting in
limited license fees and other
damages even if successfully
asserted
Search Costs Costs associated with evaluating
patent portfolios for valuable,
infringed patents and seeking out
potential infringers
Negotiation Costs Costs associated with preparing
and sending demand letters,
negotiating and drafting licensing
and settlement deals, and
1 responding to counter-assertions
104 See, e.g., Ethan Baron, Yahoo Investor Hits Back at 'Patent Troll' Critique of Activist
Shareholder Starboard Value, SILICONBEAT (May 6, 2016, 1:31 PM), http://www.siliconbeat.com]
2016/05/06/yahoo-investor-hits-back-at-patent-troll-critique-of-activist-investor-starboard-value/
(reporting on this concern with respect to Yahoo); Sebastian Anthony, Microsoft, Apple With-
draw from Android Patent Trolling: Is the Patent War Drawing to a Close?, EXTREMETECH (Dec.
24, 2014, 8:03 AM), http://www.extremetech.comlextreme/196432-microsoft-apple-pull-back-
from-android-patent-trolling-is-the-patent-war-drawing-to-a-close (describing how Microsoft,
Apple, and others used an independent company endowed with its patent assets to "troll" An-
droid-based hardware makers).
105 See Anthony, supra note 104.
106 See Asay, supra note 61, at 265.
107 Andrews, supra note 19, at 248.
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Litigation Costs Costs of filing suit, discovery,
responding to counterclaims, and
litigating to trial
Invalidity Costs Asserted patents may be
invalidated if successfully
challenged, resulting in lost
licensing opportunities and
forfeited patent rights more
broadly
Reputational Costs Assertions may damage company
reputation, resulting in less
support in capital, labor, and
I product markets
III. INDUSTRY-SPECIFIC PATENT NON-ASSERTION
Part II reviewed a variety of economic disincentives to asserting
patents. Taken in the cumulative, these factors may make it seem sur-
prising that patent holders ever assert patents. Yet while helpful, as-
sessing patent non-assertion in this general matter misses important
nuance. Indeed, clearly not all of the factors detailed above apply
equally in any given situation. In other words, different patent owners
have different risk profiles, resource and time constraints, relation-
ships vis-A-vis potential infringers, business models, and, ultimately,
different types and quantities of patents. These many differences
likely matter in any given situation as to whether a patent holder ulti-
mately asserts their patents.
This Part seeks to capture some of this missing nuance. It does so
by theorizing patent non-assertion in a more industry-specific manner.
Scholars have long argued that patents play different roles across in-
dustries.108 On this basis, some have argued for more industry-specific
tailoring of patent law. 109 This Article does not take a position on
these policy proposals. Instead, it uses their collective acknowledge-
ment of the industry-specific role of patent rights as a basis for better
theorizing why patent owners forego asserting their patents in so
many cases (as well as why they may not in others).
This Part has two basic claims. First, the different disincentives to
asserting patents detailed in Part II apply differently depending on the
industry. For instance, reputational costs for asserting patents are
likely higher in some industries, such as software, than in others, such
108 Roin, supra note 28, at 687 ("For at least the past thirty years, patent scholars have
recognized that there is substantial heterogeneity both within and across industries in the tech-
nological and economic characteristics relevant to optimal patent strength.").
109 See supra notes 24-27 and accompanying text.
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as in the pharmaceutical industry.1'0 Second, these disincentives to as-
serting patents often have dynamic relationships with one another.
For example, if an industry is generally known for patents of low or
questionable value and validity, patent assertions in that industry are
more likely to result in higher reputational costs, even in cases where
the patent is of significant commercial value and high quality. Con-
versely, in industries generally known for patents of high value and
validity, patent assertions in those industries are less likely to result in
significant reputational costs (regardless of the patent's actual value or
validity). This dynamic interaction among the different factors, I ar-
gue, likely affects the decisions of many patent owners as to whether
to forego asserting their patents.
Of course, as briefly discussed in the Introduction, it is also true
that industries lack uniformity.," In other words, even an industry-
specific approach will inevitably fail to capture all of the relevant nu-
ances in any given situation, many of which are likely relevant as to
whether a party chooses to assert its patents.1 12 But an industry-spe-
cific approach nonetheless captures important generalizations that
help explain industry-specific trends, as well as generates testable hy-
potheses for future research.11 3 It also provides a better basis for as-
sessing patent law theory and reform proposals more generally, a task
which this Article takes up in Part IV.
The following Sections assess patent non-assertion in four specific
industries: software, pharmaceuticals, biotechnology, and semiconduc-
tors. Although there are numerous other possible industries for study,
these industries are some of the more significant to the economy and
are, consequently, often selected for more intense examination.1 14 For
similar reasons, this Article selects these industries as case studies for
deeper analysis.
Software and pharmaceuticals are often said to be on opposite
ends of the spectrum in terms of patents, with patents being unimpor-
tant (and even harmful) in software and vital in pharmaceuticals.115
110 Compare Section III.A.6, with Section III.B.6.
111 See supra notes 24-28 and accompanying text.
112 See Roin, supra note 28, at 687.
113 See generally WALTZ, supra note 31, at 7 (arguing that the best models represent theory,
while also exemplifying reality).
114 See Roin, supra note 28, at 687.
115 Richard Posner, Do Patent and Copyright Law Restrict Competition and Creativity Ex-
cessively?, BECKER-POSNER BLOG (Sept. 30, 2012), http://www.becker-posner-blog.com/2012/09/
do-patent-and-copyright-law-restrict-competition-and-creativity-excessively-posner.html ("Phar-
maceutical drugs are the poster child for patent protection . . .. But the conditions that make
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Perhaps unsurprisingly, the following Sections find that these two
ends of the spectrum show the most divergence in terms of how disin-
centives to assert patents are likely to play out. In the middle of the
spectrum, the semiconductor industry shows many similarities to the
software industry in terms of patent non-assertion (but with important
differences), while the biotechnology industry is more similar to the
pharmaceutical industry (but also with important differences). The
following Sections explore these claims in greater detail.
A. The Special Case of Software
This Section claims that asserting an average software patent will
typically result in high search, negotiation, litigation, validity, and
reputational costs, and that an average software patent is likely to be
of low value. Furthermore, in many cases these factors likely exacer-
bate one another, thereby increasing the costs of asserting an average
software patent. Overall, these high barriers to patent assertion would
thus seem to predict that patent non-assertion will be the norm in the
software world, and that rates of patent assertion in the software in-
dustry will be lower than in other industries with more modest barri-
ers to patent assertion.
Yet recent rises in patent assertion rates are largely attributable
to software patents.116 Can this reality be reconciled with this Article's
claim that barriers to asserting software patents are generally high?
This Section argues that reconciling the two actually leads to impor-
tant insights. For instance, because of the high costs associated with
asserting software patents, software patent holders often undertake
efforts to minimize those costs while realizing some benefit from their
patents; the primary means of doing so is to shift many of these costs
to so-called patent trolls, which results in higher levels of software pat-
ent assertion than would otherwise be expected.117 Furthermore, some
software companies have sought to mitigate these costs by specializing
in patent assertion themselves, thereby effectively becoming patent
assertion entities.118 This all suggests that high barriers to patent asser-
tion may, ironically, result in increased rates of patent assertion in a
given industry as parties outsource or otherwise attempt to mitigate
patent protection essential in the pharmaceutical industry are absent [in the software
industry].").
116 James Bessen, A Generation of Software Patents, 18 B.U. J. Sci. & TECH. L. 241, 257
(2012).
117 See infra notes 196-98 and accompanying text.
118 See infra notes 199-201 and accompanying text.
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the high costs of patent assertion. The following Sections explore
these points in greater detail.
1. The Low Value of Software Patents
The value of an average software patent is likely to be low, and
that low value may deter patent assertion in many cases. Software pat-
ents may generally exhibit low value for several reasons. For starters,
many software patents may be of poor quality, which decreases their
overall value.119 Indeed, this has been a common complaint of
software patents for some time.120 And while it is a disputed point, it
seems to hold true in many cases.121 Hence, in cases where it does, that
low value may deter the patent owner from asserting the patent.
But even in cases where a software patent's quality is high, the
software patent may still have low value for other reasons, and that
low value may also deter many patent assertions. For instance, mod-
ern software innovation is typically incremental and cumulative. 12 2
This means that any given software patent may only cover a modest
innovation, thereby decreasing the overall value of such a patent. In
some cases, parties may still assert such patents by engaging in strate-
gic behavior, such as "patent holdup" or "royalty stacking"-tactics
that can artificially inflate the value of otherwise low-value patents. 12 3
But there is at least some evidence that these types of holdup
problems are not as significant as often imagined. 12 4 Hence, the low
value of many software patents stemming from the incremental and
cumulative nature of software innovation may also deter many patent
holders from asserting them.
119 See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 25, at 187-214; James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer,
Lessons for Patent Policy from Empirical Research on Patent Litigation, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L.
REV. 1, 16 (2005); Arti K. Rai, Improving (Software) Patent Quality Through the Administrative
Process, 51 Hous. L. REV. 503, 509-11 (2013) (reviewing the literature on software patent litiga-
tion and its implications for software patent quality). But see generally John R. Allison & Ronald
J. Mann, The Disputed Quality of Software Patents, 85 WASH. U. L. REv. 297 (2007) (reviewing
and then refuting the claim that software patents are generally of low quality on the basis of an
empirical analysis).
120 See supra note 119.
121 See Allison & Mann, supra note 119, at 324.
122 Pamela Samuelson et al., A Manifesto Concerning the Legal Protection of Computer
Programs, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2308, 2331 (1994).
123 See Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX. L.
REV. 1991, 1992-94 (2007) (describing the problems of patent holdup and royalty stacking when
complicated products with multiple patentable features are subject to patent assertions).
124 See, e.g., Ronald J. Mann, Do Patents Facilitate Financing in the Software Industry?, 83
TEX. L. REV. 961, 1004-05 (2005) (providing evidence suggesting that claims of patent "thicket"
problems are largely unfounded).
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Another reason software patents are increasingly losing value lies
in recent Supreme Court jurisprudence. For instance, in Alice Corp.
Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank International,125 the Court effectively decreased
the value of many software patents by making them more likely to be
found invalid.1 26 It did so by reformulating the test for determining
whether a patent covers an "abstract idea," a category traditionally
ineligible for patent protection. 1 2 7 The Court did not explicitly refer to
software in its decision.128 But the test it articulated meant that most
granted software patents are likely ineligible for patent protection, in
large part because earlier generations of patent prosecutors drafted
software patents in ways that fail to satisfy the Alice test.12 9 As evi-
dence in support of this point, courts applying Alice have found the
vast majority of software patents invalid for failure to claim patenta-
ble subject matter. 1 3 0 These outcomes may change for future software
patents as parties adjust their patent drafting methods to better ac-
count for the Alice test.' 3 ' But for now, Alice decreases the value of
many software patents by making them more likely to be invalidated,
which in turn may make it less likely that they will be asserted.
Of course, many software patents may be said to exhibit high
value in part because of software's ubiquity. For instance, that ubiq-
uity may increase a software patent's value by increasing the number
of potential targets. Hence, even if a given software patent only covers
a modest software innovation, software's ubiquity may increase the
patent's value by increasing the chances that many parties practice the
patented software. This greater array of targets may be particularly
likely because the boundaries of software patents are often difficult to
determine,1 32 which may mean that software patent holders have
greater ability to legitimately assert their patents against more parties.
And if all of this is true, many software patents may actually have high
value because of the greater number of potential infringers and, thus,
revenue streams.
125 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014).
126 See id. at 2360.
127 See id.
128 Id.
129 See Gene Quinn, The Ramifications of Alice: A Conversation with Mark Lemley,
IPWATCHDOG (Sept. 4, 2014), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2014/09/04/the-ramifications-of-alice-
a-conversation-with-mark-lemley/id=51023/.
130 See, e.g., Yasser M. El-Gamal et al., Down the Rabbit Hole: Trends in Software Patent
Court Decisions Post-Alice, LEXOLOGY (Dec. 22, 2015), http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.
aspx?g=AB50e680-2ee4-451c-a2d7-720aa75fa914.
131 Asay, supra note 61, at 311-12.
132 See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 25, at 152.
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Yet while these factors in isolation may increase the potential
value of many software patents, other factors, discussed above and
more fully below, can offset any such increase in value. For instance,
while the fuzziness of software patents' boundaries may increase the
number of potential targets, that same fuzziness may increase the
costs of analyzing one's patents, identifying infringers, and negotiating
with them.13 3 It may also increase litigation costs and the possibility of
the asserted patents being invalidated, including on the basis of the
Alice decision or their low quality. Hence, while software's ubiquity
may increase the value of many software patents by providing for
more potential infringers, taking into account the frequently dynamic
relationships between the different costs and risks of asserting
software patents may frequently offset any potential increase in value.
In sum, there are a number of reasons why software patents may
often exhibit low value. That low value, in turn, is likely to deter many
patent owners from asserting them. Furthermore, the value of many
software patents appears to have a dynamic relationship with the
other costs associated with asserting software patents, as briefly dis-
cussed above and more fully examined below.
2. Search Costs
On average, the search costs associated with asserting a software
patent are likely to be high for several reasons. First, the last several
decades have seen a significant increase in the overall number of
software patents.134 As such, any given software patent owner is likely
to own a good number of patents to sift through in assessing whether
they have patents worth asserting. Of course, this general trend of
growing numbers of software patents does not affect all patent owners
equally; some parties own significant numbers of patents, some have
moderate numbers, and some only a few.135 But the overall growth in
software patents does mean that it is more likely a software patent
owner will own some, and perhaps even many, software patents, par-
133 See id. at 152-55.
134 See, e.g., Brian Kahin, Software Patents: Separating Rhetoric from Facts, Sci. PROGRESS
(May 15, 2013), http://scienceprogress.org/2013/05/software-patents-separating-rhetoric-from-
facts/ (showing the significant increase in overall numbers of software patents granted over the
last several decades in graph form).
135 For instance, IBM has acquired the most patents of any company for twenty-three
straight years. Jing Cao & Susan Decker, IBM Has Most U.S. Patents for 23rd Year in Cloud,




ticularly since effective defensive patent portfolios-a growing trend
in the software industry-require significant numbers of patents.1 36
A second reason that search costs are likely to be high stems from
the difficulty in ascertaining the meaning and scope of any given
software patent. Indeed, the meaning and scope of software patents is
notoriously difficult to determine without multiple layers of litiga-
tion.137 Unlike other fields such as chemistry and biotechnology,
where "a clear scientific language [exists] for delineating what a pat-
ent claim does and doesn't cover," software patents have no such stan-
dard language.138 This is exacerbated by the fact that those drafting
software patents often purposefully inject ambiguity into the patents
in hopes of broadening their scope.1 39 Hence, the fuzzy boundaries of
software patents will often increase search costs as parties encounter
greater uncertainty in assessing their own patents and potential in-
stances of infringement.
Third, the fuzzy boundaries of software patents, as well as the
sheer number of software patents, also increase search costs by mak-
ing it more difficult to assess potential counterclaims. As discussed
above, even once a party has evaluated its own patents and identified
potential infringers, that party may wish to assess the target's patent
portfolio and other prior art, all in order to evaluate potential coun-
terclaims. 1 4 0 But the high volume of software patents and their often
indeterminate scope mean that such evaluations will often prove diffi-
cult and, thus, costly.
In the aggregate, these factors thus mean that software patent
holders will often experience significant search costs in evaluating
their own patent portfolios, the identity of potential infringers, and
the strength of potential counterclaims. These search costs, even on
their own, are likely high enough to deter many patent assertions. Fur-
thermore, these search costs are likely to increase-and thus act as an
even greater deterrent to patent assertion-because of their dynamic
136 See, e.g., Bessen, supra note 116, at 257 (highlighting that while more software compa-
nies increasingly obtain patents, still relatively few software companies obtain patents at all);
Mann, supra note 124, at 990-91 (providing survey results that indicate a major reason for
software companies to obtain patents is for defensive purposes).




140 See supra Section 1I.B.
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relationships with other categories of disincentives to patent assertion,
as discussed more fully below.1 4 1
3. Negotiation Costs
Software patent assertions are likely to result in high negotiation
costs for several reasons. Perhaps most importantly, it will often be
the case, at least for parties that produce products, that an assertion
results in some type of counter-assertion. 142 Indeed, some scholarship
suggests that this is a significant reason why many parties do not assert
their software patents in cases where they could. 1 4 3 Furthermore, as
previously discussed, the growing numbers of issued software patents
and the buildup of defensive patent portfolios mean that the likeli-
hood of a counter-assertion is, on average, much higher today than it
was previously. 14 4
To illustrate: a patent owner may own a patent that is likely in-
fringed, while the potential infringer owns a significant number of pat-
ents. Asserting the patent against the infringer is thus likely to result
in significant costs, such as evaluating the counter-asserted patents
and negotiating the terms of a license and settlement. And the terms
may not be favorable given the disparity in patent leverage between
the parties.
Moreover, even in cases where a party has significant patent lev-
erage over the other party, negotiation costs may still be high. For
instance, the party will still need to divert resources to negotiating a
license and settlement agreement. And such diversions can undermine
firm culture, morale, and focus. 1 4 5 In other words, the transaction costs
resulting from a patent assertion may not be worth the assertion given
tangible and intangible losses that the assertion leads to.
Furthermore, these negotiation costs may be higher in the
software context simply because, as discussed above, ascertaining the
scope and meaning of software patents is often quite difficult.14 6 In
other words, negotiations may become more protracted than they oth-
erwise would be in part because the parties have a difficult time deter-
mining (and agreeing on) the scope of the respective patents, their
value, and how to structure a licensing and settlement deal accord-
141 See infra Section III.A.7.
142 See Bessen & Meurer, supra note 4, at 413.
143 See Mann, supra note 124, at 980-82.
144 See supra Section III.A.2.
145 Mann, supra note 124, at 981-84.
146 See supra Section III.A.2.
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ingly. 14 7 Overall, then, high negotiation costs, either separately or in
combination with some of the other types of costs discussed herein,
may dissuade many software patent owners from asserting their
patents.
One point of clarity: the negotiation costs associated with assess-
ing and responding to counterclaims, while related to the search costs
associated with assessing potential counterclaims discussed above, are
nonetheless different, additional costs. In the pre-assertion context,
for instance, parties often incur search costs in speculating what coun-
terclaims may be likely, all in order to assess whether the overall ben-
efits of asserting patents against a party outweigh the costs. 1 4 8 But
once a party has asserted patents against another party, some of the
actual counter-assertions materialize, at which point the party may in-
cur additional costs in negotiating with the other party, as described
above. And those additional negotiation costs, for the reasons also
detailed above, are likely to be high in the software context.
4. Litigation Costs
Litigation costs associated with software patent assertions are
likely to be high, in part because patent litigation in general is simply
expensive. 1 4 9 But there are additional reasons why software patent liti-
gation costs may be high relative to other types of patent litigation.
First, the difficulty of ascertaining the meaning and scope of
software patents makes it more plausible that software patent litiga-
tion will need to undergo several rounds of litigation, including ap-
peals and remands to district courts, before a final outcome is
reached.150 In other words, the uncertain scope and meaning of
software patents may dissuade many parties from asserting them, sim-
ply because the high costs associated with multiple rounds of litigation
are entirely possible, and, perhaps, even likely.
Interestingly, a recent study by Jonas Anderson and Peter Menell
shows that parties involved in computer-related and other software-
related patent litigations appeal their cases at a lower rate, in absolute
terms, than certain other types of patent cases. 151 But this may simply
be evidence confirming that the uncertainty associated with software-
147 Lemley, supra note 137, at 930-31.
148 See Bessen & Meurer, supra note 4, at 413.
149 See supra Section II.B.
150 See Moore, supra note 100, at 3.
151 J. Jonas Anderson & Peter S. Menell, Informal Deference: A Historical, Empirical, and
Normative Analysis of Patent Claim Construction, 108 Nw. U. L. REV. 1, 51-53 (2014). Note that
the many patent appeals were included in multiple categories, simply because the patents in-
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related patents-and the likely high litigation costs that such uncer-
tainty entails-pushes many parties to settle their disputes early,
rather than fully litigating them. Of course, it is an open question as to
why parties initiate software-patent litigations in the first place, given
that this uncertainty, and the high litigation costs associated with it,
also existed prior to the litigation. But in many cases, parties may sim-
ply miscalculate the costs of asserting their patents, only realizing the
extent of the costs later in the process.
Indeed, such miscalculations may be particularly likely in part be-
cause it is often difficult for the original patent asserter to anticipate
ex ante the exact counterclaims they will face (even if they can antici-
pate that some counterclaims are likely). Accurately anticipating
counterclaims (and the costs associated with them) may be particu-
larly difficult in the software context because the uncertain scope and
meaning of software patents means that counterclaims may material-
ize from unexpected sources.
Counterclaims thus represent a second reason why litigation costs
may be particularly high in software patent litigation. And this is so
for at least two reasons. First, as previously discussed, the likelihood
of counterclaims is growing on average, particularly as more parties in
the software industry acquire increasing numbers of patents.152 Sec-
ond, because of the uncertain scope and meaning of software patents,
counterclaims may result in higher than expected costs as parties are
forced to muddle through multiple rounds of litigation to resolve their
disputes.
In sum, litigation costs are likely to be high in the software indus-
try. This is so in part simply because patent litigation is extremely ex-
pensive. But the uncertainty associated with software patents, and the
likelihood of counterclaims, increases these costs in ways that may de-
ter many parties from ever asserting their software patents in the first
place. And for those that do, these costs may eventually push parties
to settle rather than fully litigate the dispute.
5. Invalidity Costs
Software patent holders that assert their patents are likely to in-
cur invalidity costs for several reasons. For instance, courts and other
tribunals, such as the Patent Trial and Appeals Board ("PTAB"), find
volve more than one category. Id. at 52. Hence, computer-related patent appeals may include
many software patent appeals, and vice-versa.
152 See Bessen & Meurer, supra note 4, at 413.
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challenged patents invalid at relatively high rates.1 5 3 Furthermore,
some (albeit limited) evidence suggests that these reviewing tribunals
are even more likely to find software patents invalid than other types
of patents. 154
There are good reasons why this may be true. First, much of the
prior art in software is not patented for various reasons, but patent
examiners typically mostly search issued patents when assessing new
patent applications.155 This means that when this non-patent prior art
does surface, such as when a party finds and presents it in court or at
the PTAB, many issued software patents are invalid because they do
not cover new material or are obvious in light of this prior art. These
risks and the associated costs may thus deter many parties from assert-
ing their software patents, let alone daring to fully litigate them.
Second, even setting aside this unpatented prior art, the sheer
number of software patents may also increase the risks of invalidity.
For instance, in processing patent applications, patent examiners may
often find it difficult to assess all relevant patented software prior art,
since there is so much of it and examiners spend so little overall time
examining any given patent application. 1 56 But once patent holders as-
sert their rights against third parties, those third parties have every
motivation to seek out all relevant patented prior art as evidence that
the asserted patent is invalid.1 5 7
Third, these risks of invalidity have increased in the wake of the
Supreme Court's Alice decision. As previously discussed, this decision
has significantly increased the likelihood that challenged software pat-
ents will be found invalid for failing to claim patentable subject mat-
ter.1 8 In fact, post-Alice decisions have so overwhelmingly invalidated
contested software patents that invalidation may be a near certainty,
rather than a mere risk. Part IV discusses the implications of this re-
sult in greater detail.
153 See Love & Ambwani, supra note 97, at 94-95.
154 John R. Allison et al., Patent Quality and Settlement Among Repeat Patent Litigants, 99
Gao. L.J. 677, 707-09 (2011).
155 Julie E. Cohen, Reverse Engineering and the Rise of Electronic Vigilantism: Intellectual
Property Implications of "Lock-Out" Programs, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1091, 1177-79 (1995); Dennis
M. de Guzman, In Re Epstein: A Case of Patent Hearsay, 70 WASH. L. REV. 805, 809-11 (1995).
156 Lemley, supra note 12, at 1500 (indicating that patent examiners spend on average eigh-
teen hours total per patent application).
157 See Greg Reilly, Decoupling Patent Law, 97 B.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017) (manu-
script at 15), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2854375 (indicating that ac-
cused infringers are "strongly incentivized to identify, develop, and exploit any problem,
ambiguity, or uncertainty in the patent").
158 See supra notes 125-31 and accompanying text.
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In sum, for at least the three reasons identified above, software
patent asserters face high risks that they will incur invalidity costs.
These costs may on their own may be sufficient to deter many
software patent assertions, let alone when combined with the other
high costs described herein.
6. Reputational Costs
Software patent holders are likely to incur significant reputa-
tional costs when they assert their patents. This is so, in part, because
asserting software patents violates growing norms of collaboration
and openness that permeate the software industry.159 And as other
scholars have recognized, norms in an industry can often be more im-
portant than actual legal rules.1 60
The software industry's growing norms of openness and collabo-
ration largely derive from the free and open source software move-
ment. For the last several decades, this movement has championed
sharing software externally and collaborating with other software de-
velopers to build software resources collectively.1 61 This model of
software innovation powers some of the most important software
technologies and services in the world-including Linux, Android,
Apache, Mozilla, Facebook, Netflix, Airbnb, and countless others. 162
Indeed, this movement has proved so successful that its tenets are in-
creasingly a part of everyday life in corporate America.1 63
159 See Clark D. Asay, A Case for the Public Domain, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 753, 765-66 (2013)
(reviewing some of these changes).
160 See Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code's Search
for Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1765, 1771 (1996) (discussing the role of
norms in interactions between members of the National Grain and Feed Association); Lisa
Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond
Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115, 115 (1992) (describing the trade codes and private arbitration
tribunals used to resolve disputes in the New York diamond industry); Lisa Bernstein, Private
Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation Through Rules, Norms, and Insti-
tutions, 99 MICH. L. REv. 1724, 1724 (2001) (discussing how the "cotton industry has almost
entirely opted out of the public legal system" and instead relies on private legal system of its own
creation).
161 See Asay, supra note 159, at 765-77.
162 Id. at 761, 766-67; Jake Flomenberg, The Rise of OPEN Innovation: The 3P's for Build-
ing a Durable Open Software Company, ACCEL INSIGHTS (Feb. 26, 2016), https://medium.com/
accel-insights/the-rise-of-open-innovation-the-3p-s-for-building-a-durable-open-software-com
pany-3bc6eOec6fa7#.c9a6Oztwv.
163 See The Tenth Annual Future of Open Source Survey, BLACK DUCK (2016), https://
www.blackducksoftware.com/2016-future-of-open-source (noting high percentages of companies
that contribute to and use free and open source software technologies).
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Yet importantly, the movement's norms conflict with some of pat-
ent law's core tenets.1 6 4 For instance, a patent centralizes rights in
whoever owns the patent, whereas open innovation movements thrive
in part because authority is decentralized.1 65 In other words, the open
innovation model works in part because no single party controls par-
ticipants in any given software project; participants are free to use and
contribute to the software project as they please, subject to satisfying
a variety of possible license conditions.1 66
Hence, in part because of this conflict, the role of patents has
drawn increased (and often negative) attention in the software indus-
try.167 Parties have tried and proposed a variety of potential solutions
to reconciling this conflict,1 68 many of which focus on using patents as
defensive tools against patent assertion.1 69 Patent holders in the
software industry also increasingly "pledge" some or all of their pat-
ents to the public. 70 In such scenarios, software patent owners volun-
tarily commit to forego enforcing the pledged patents.171 There are a
variety of possible reasons behind these pledges.1 72 But most of these
reasons often focus, in one form or another, on facilitating some type
of collaborative innovation,1 73 including generating "network ef-
fects."1 7 4 And while the free and open source software movement may
not be solely responsible for this trend, its important role in pushing
164 See generally Clark D. Asay, Enabling Patentless Innovation, 74 MD. L. REV. 431 (2015)
(exploring some of these conflicts).
165 See id. at 432; Yochai Benkler, Coase's Penguin, or, Linux and The Nature of the Firm,
112 YALE L.J. 369, 375 (2002) ("Commons-based peer production, the emerging third model ...
relies on decentralized information gathering and exchange to reduce the uncertainty of
participants.").
166 See David McGowan, The Tory Anarchism of F/OSS Licensing, 78 U. CHi. L. REV. 207,
207 (2011) (arguing in favor of the importance of these licensing conditions in making the model
work).
167 See, e.g., Kristen Osenga, Debugging Software's Schemas, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1832,
1844-47 (2014) (describing some of this controversy).
168 See Asay, supra note 164, at 472-80 (reviewing the main categories of such proposals).
169 See, e.g., Jason Schultz & Jennifer M. Urban, Protecting Open Innovation: The Defensive
Patent License as a New Approach to Patent Threats, Transaction Costs, and Tactical Disarma-
ment, 26 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 37 (2012) (proposing the "Defensive Patent License" as a rem-
edy to patent risks in the free and open source software world).
170 See, e.g., Jorge L. Contreras, Patent Pledges, 47 ARIz. ST. L.J. 543, 545 (2015).
171 See id. at 543.
172 See id. at 573-93 (describing the various motivations behind patent pledges).
173 See id. at 588-90.
174 For a discussion of network effects in the world of software, see generally Max
Schanzenbach, Network Effects and Antitrust Law: Predation, Affirmative Defenses, and the Case
of U.S. v. Microsoft, 2002 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 4, 8 (discussing operating systems and comple-
mentary software products as exhibiting network effects).
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innovators toward more collaborative innovation in general cannot be
denied. 75
Given these growing norms, software patent holders that violate
them by asserting patents are likely to incur significant reputational
costs. One such cost may be that many third-party software develop-
ers-so many of which have embraced these norms-will be less likely
to adopt (and support) the asserter's goods and services.1 7 6 And in
today's software world, that is a significant cost, because companies
often depend on third-party developers to make their own more at-
tractive.1 77 For instance, Apple's app store without third-party apps is
hardly alluring,'1 78 nor is a game console with limited numbers of third-
party games.1 79 This means that alienating those third parties via pat-
ent assertions can significantly affect a company's bottom line. And if
much of the industry is focused on using patents only defensively and
finding other ways to limit patent aggression, 80 then patent assertions
are, in fact, likely to alienate much of the industry.
A related cost of asserting patents in the software industry is
greater difficulty in hiring and retaining talented employees in an in-
175 See Elon Musk, All Our Patent Are Belong to You, TESLA BLOG (June 12, 2014), https://
www.tesla.com/blog/all-our-patent-are-belong-you (describing Tesla's patent pledge as being in
the "spirit" of the open source software movement).
176 See, e.g., Ryan Paul, Oracle's Java Lawsuit Undermines Its Open Source Credibility, AR-
sTECHNICA (Aug. 14, 2010, 4:08 PM), http://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2010/08/ora
cles-java-lawsuit-undermines-its-open-source-credibility/ (describing a possible fallout of cus-
tomers and users because of an Oracle patent lawsuit against Google).
177 See Michael Vakulenko, 5 Ways Developers Can Extend Your Business Model, Vi-
sIONMOBILE (Jan. 11, 2016), http://www.visionmobile.com/blog/2016/01/5-ways-developers-can-
extend-your-business-model] (discussing five specific ways that third-party developers are impor-
tant to creating value for companies).
178 Apple Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 18 (Oct. 27, 2009), http://files.shareholder.com/
downloads/AAPL/4244750170x0xS1193125%2DO9%2D214859/320193/filing.pdf ("The Com-
pany's future performance depends on support from third-party software developers. If third-
party software applications and services cease to be developed and maintained for the Com-
pany's products, customers may choose not to buy the Company's products.").
179 Paul Tassi, An Inside Explanation of Why Third Parties Have Left the Wii U, FORBES
(Jan. 11, 2014, 11:20 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/insertcoin/2014/01/11/an-inside-explana
tion-of-why-third-parties-have-left-the-wii-u/#3aa5235357b1 (discussing reasons why third-party
game developers have ceased developing games for the Wii U).
180 For a discussion of another recent and important effort to limit patent aggression in the
software industry, see Matt Levy, The License on Transfer Network Is a LOT of Good, PAT.
PROGRESS (July 18, 2014), http://www.patentprogress.org/2014/07/18/license-transfer-network-
lot-good/ (discussing the "License on Transfer Network" of patents, whereby any patent in-




creasingly competitive labor market.181 This cost can be particularly
significant since software engineers in today's world are, in some re-
spects, the most important assets of many technology companies. 182
Indeed, "acqhires," where companies purchase other companies solely
for their talented engineers, are increasingly common.183 Hence, re-
maining competitive for talented software engineers requires at least
some acceptance of the norms of open innovation, since the current
generation of software engineers in particular has largely embraced
them. 18 4 Aggressive patent enforcement can thus harm a patent
holder's ability to attract and retain talented engineers, since such en-
forcement conflicts with the norms that many of these engineers ad-
here to.
In fact, some patent pledges seem squarely aimed at currying
favor with engineers by disavowing patent aggression, such as Twit-
ter's pledge not to assert any of its patents unless it receives permis-
sion from the employee(s) responsible for the patented invention.18 5
While less overt, Microsoft's recent spate of patent pledging also
seems to be motivated, at least in part, by a desire to rehabilitate a
somewhat tarnished reputation in developer communities. 18 6
In sum, patent assertions in the software industry can entail high
reputational costs that may undermine commercial success in impor-
tant respects. Of course, patent holders may still find patent assertions
worthwhile, despite these costs, in a variety of cases.' 87 But the reputa-
181 See Sean Gallagher, Software Is Eating the Job Market, TECHCRUNCH (June 9, 2015),
https://techcrunch.com/2015/06/09/software-is-eating-the-job-marketl.
182 Venkatesh Rao, The Rise of Developeronomics, FORBES (Dec. 5, 2011, 6:32 PM), http://
www.forbes.com/sites/venkateshrao/2011/12/05/the-rise-of-developeronomics/#3f4abdebl548
(discussing how software engineers have become the most important asset of many companies).
183 Miguel Helft, For Buyers of Web Start-Ups, Quest to Corral Young Talent, N.Y. TIMES
(May 17, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/18/technology/18talent.html?-r=0 (discussing
the growing phenomenon of "acqhire[s]").
184 Simon Phipps, The Rise and Rise of Open Source, INFOWORLD (May 8, 2015), http://
www.infoworld.com/article/2914643/open-source-software/rise-and-rise-of-open-source.html;
Erin Richey, 5 Things to Know About the Rise of Open Source, FORBES (Apr. 9, 2015, 4:53 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/centurylink/2015/04/09/5-things-to-know-about-the-rise-of-open-
source/#6d8ab0ec780f.
185 Adam Messinger, Introducing the Innovator's Patent Agreement, TwirrER (Apr. 17,
2012, 5:00 PM), https://blog.twitter.com/2012/introducing-the-innovator-s-patent-agreement.
186 Asay, supra note 61, at 294-95.
187 See Kevin McLaughlin, Microsoft Exec: Linux Patent Licensing Becoming 'Less Rele-
vant' as We Embrace Open Source Partnerships, CRN (Apr. 26, 2016, 6:43 PM), http://
www.crn.com/news/applications-os/300080479/microsoft-exec-linux-patent-licensing-becoming-
less-relevant-as-we-embrace-open-source-partnerships.htm (discussing how Microsoft asserts its
patents against users of Android, but also noting that these assertions may diminish as Microsoft
increasingly adopts the norms of open innovation).
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tional costs associated with asserting patents in the software industry
are nonetheless increasingly significant and likely to affect whether a
given software patent holder decides to assert its rights.
7. Dynamic Costs
Importantly, the six categories of costs reviewed above are likely
to have dynamic relationships in many cases. Some of this dynamism
was discussed or alluded to in the preceding Sections. For instance, as
briefly touched upon, the high risks of invalidity lower the value of
many software patents.188 Furthermore, a widespread perception of
low-value, invalid software patents may increase the reputational costs
associated with asserting a patent.189 And this may be true even in
cases where the patent is actually valid and of relatively high value. In
addition, the norms behind open software innovation that lead to
reputational costs for asserting patents may also increase the risks that
software patents will be invalidated and considered of low value. This
may be so, for instance, if those norms are so entrenched that biases
against software patents affect judicial assessments of validity and
value.
Search, negotiation, and litigation costs will also often affect each
other. For instance, as discussed above, search costs may include as-
sessing not only one's own patent portfolio, but also the patent portfo-
lios of likely infringers (and others), all in order to assess the
likelihood of counterclaims and what negotiation and litigation costs
may follow. Furthermore, once counterclaims in fact materialize,
search costs exacerbate negotiation and litigation costs as parties incur
additional costs sifting through the patents and other prior art used in
those counterclaims. And in the software industry, these added costs
may be quite high, since the difficulties of assessing one's own pat-
ents 90 also apply in examining the patents (and other prior art) of
third parties. Furthermore, invalidity costs may also affect search, ne-
gotiation, and litigation costs, since the high risks of incurring them
may force parties to spend more time assessing their own patents, po-
tential infringers, and engaging in negotiation and litigation.
In the software industry, therefore, many of the categories of high
costs reviewed above are likely to exacerbate each other in ways that
make software patent assertions even less likely than when these cate-
188 See supra notes 125-31 and accompanying text.
189 See supra Section III.A.6.
190 See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 25, at 152.
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gories are considered in isolation. Table 2 below summarizes the
above analysis relating to the software industry.
TABLE 2. DISINCENTIVES TO PATENT ASSERTION IN THE
SOFTWARE INDUSTRY
Factor Analysis
Value of Patent(s) Low, including by way of
perception. May be further
decreased by invalidity and
reputational costs
Search Costs High. May be exacerbated by
negotiation, litigation, and
invalidity costs
Negotiation Costs High. May be exacerbated by
litigation and invalidity costs
Litigation Costs High. May be exacerbated by
negotiation and invalidity costs
Invalidity Costs High. May be exacerbated by
reputational factors
Reputational Costs High. May be exacerbated by
perceptions that software patents
have low value or are invalid
8. Mitigating the Costs
It is worth reiterating that the above analysis is a general one and
may not fully explain any given instance of patent non-assertion in the
software industry. But that is how theories work-they seek to explain
events in general, while acknowledging that details relevant to any
given situation are necessarily left out.191
More problematic for a theoretical model, however, is if it does
not track reality at all. At first glance, this may seem to be a problem
for the software industry model described above. For instance, these
factors would seem to predict low rates of patent assertion in the
software industry. Yet recent rises in patent litigation rates are largely
attributable to software patent assertions.19 2 Indeed, some recent evi-
dence shows that software patents are much more likely to be en-
forced in litigation than some other types of patents,193 though it is still
the case that the vast majority of software patents are never as-
serted.1 94 But the rise in software patent assertions relative to other
191 See WALTZ, supra note 31, at 7.
192 Bessen, supra note 116, at 249.
193 See John R. Allison et al., Patent Litigation and the Internet, 2012 STAN. TECH. L. REV.
3, 4 (discussing litigation rates of internet patents).
194 See, e.g., James Bessen, The Case Against Software Patents, in 9 Charts, Vox (Sept. 15,
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types of patent assertions is nonetheless troubling given the analysis
above. What explains this potential discrepancy?
While the growth of the software industry in general provides one
possible answer, the more persuasive response is patent trolling. 195 As
others have documented, the recent uptick in software patent asser-
tions (and patent assertions in general) is largely attributable to patent
trolling. 196 This reality points to an important claim of this Article:
high barriers to patent assertion in a given industry may, ironically,
result in higher rates of patent assertion by fostering patent trolling.
How would high barriers to patent assertion in an industry result
in increasing rates of patent assertion? They may do so principally in
one of two ways. First, the high costs of patent assertion may push
some software patent owners to attempt to mitigate these costs (while
still realizing some economic benefit from their patents) by outsourc-
ing those costs to a specialized patent assertion entity, i.e., a patent
troll. 1 9 7 For instance, a company may be able to avoid many of the
otherwise debilitating costs described above by licensing or selling its
software patents to a patent troll. 198 A patent troll then does the dirty
work: the troll assesses the patents and likely infringers, begins an as-
sertion campaign, collects licensing fees, and ultimately may pass
some of these fees back to the original patent owner. The patent troll
thus assumes many of the search, negotiation, litigation, and invalidity
costs described above. Furthermore, patent trolls' immunity to
counter-assertions eliminates some of the costs that a software patent
owner would otherwise incur.199 Nor are trolls dissuaded from patent
assertions because of potential reputational repercussions. And the
original patent owner, behind the veil of the patent troll, may also be
able to escape many of the reputational costs as well.
2014, 11:08 AM), http://www.vox.com/2014/7/7/5862284/9-charts-that-show-patents-are-bad-for-
the-software-industry (showing that only about 5% of software patents become involved in
litigation).
195 See John R. Allison et al., Extreme Value or Trolls on Top? The Characteristics of the
Most-Litigated Patents, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 32 (2009); Joe Mullin, Patent Troll Lawsuits Head
Toward All-Time High, ARSTECHNICA (July 10, 2015, 3:00 PM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-pol
icy/2015/07/patent-troll-lawsuits-head-towards-all-time-high/ (showing that patent trolls are re-
sponsible for 68% of all patent suits, with that number rising to 90% in the high-tech sector).
196 Lemley, supra note 137, at 933 & n.113; James Bessen, The Patent Troll Crisis Is Really a
Software Patent Crisis, WASH. POST: THE SWITCH (Sept. 3, 2013), https://www.washington
post.com/news/the-switch/wp/2013/09/03/the-patent-troll-crisis-is-really-a-software-patent-crisis/.
197 See Lemley & Melamed, supra note 4, at 2122, 2124-25 ("Patent trolls typically, but not
always, acquire their patents from others.").
198 See Tom Ewing, Indirect Exploitation of Intellectual Property Rights by Corporations
and Investors, 4 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 1, 5 (2012).
199 Bessen & Meurer, supra note 4, at 413.
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Second, software patent owners may seek to reduce the costs of
patent assertion by specializing in patent assertion themselves. 20 0 Spe-
cialization may reduce many of these costs in a number of ways. For
instance, by focusing on patent assertion, a software patent owner ob-
tains efficiencies in searching, negotiating, and litigating its patents,
thereby reducing many of the more significant costs described
above. 201 Furthermore, the patent owner is likely able to mitigate in-
validity risks, because its specialization in patent assertion may pro-
vide it with a more grounded sense as to which of its patents are likely
valid and otherwise valuable. Finally, in some cases the software pat-
ent owner may not face significant reputational costs because they are
no longer providing goods and services to the public.202
Hence, rather than undermining this Article's theoretical model,
the rise in software patent assertions due to patent troll activity in-
stead suggests that high barriers to patent assertion in an industry may
unintentionally increase patent assertion rates as parties shift those
high costs to third parties or specialize in patent assertion themselves.
Accordingly, if lower rates of patent assertion are normatively a good
thing, then the key to reducing assertion rates (in the software indus-
try and elsewhere) may be to ensure moderate costs relating to patent
assertion, or at least to ensure that the high barriers to patent asser-
tion deter patent trolling rather than patent assertion in general. Part
IV will further explore these issues.
B. The Special Case of Pharmaceuticals
As briefly mentioned in the Introduction, the pharmaceutical in-
dustry differs in important respects from the software industry.203 The
following Sections explore some of these differences to help explain
how patent assertion in the pharmaceutical industry differs from that
in the software world and elsewhere.
1. The High Value of Pharmaceutical Patents
Commentators often point to the pharmaceutical industry as the
best example of where patents work well.2 0 4 This claim has much to do
200 See Osenga, supra note 32, at 444-45.
201 Id. at 466 (describing these types of entities as achieving efficiencies "through the divi-
sion of labor").
202 But see id. (demonstrating that many such entities do, in fact, still produce goods and
services for public consumption).
203 See supra text accompanying notes 31-32.
204 See, e.g., Price, supra note 29, at 1452 (noting that "[t]he pharmaceutical and biomedical
industries are typically characterized as areas where patents work fairly well" in part because
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with the fact that the industry is capital intensive. 2 05 In other words,
"pioneering" or brand-name pharmaceutical companies must often in-
vest billions of dollars in research and development activities before
they are able to bring a pharmaceutical product to market.206 These
costs include those associated with satisfying the Food and Drug Ad-
ministration's ("FDA") requirements, such as extensive clinical test-
ing aimed at verifying the product's "safety, efficacy, pharmacology,
and toxicology." 207 These costs also include high failure rates, since the
vast majority of drugs never actually make it out of a company's re-
search and development pipeline.208 Consequently, the ability to ex-
clude competitors from copying successful products-and thereby
recoup some of these costs-is vital to a pharmaceutical company's
willingness to make such large investments.209 Hence, patents in the
pharmaceutical industry are said to work as intended, i.e., as ex ante
incentives for parties to pursue innovative activity they would other-
wise be too risk-averse to undertake. 2 1 0
This leads to a patent acquisition strategy in the pharmaceutical
sector that some have identified as patent "portfolio optimization." 211
In other words, because the ability to exclude competitors from prac-
ticing their inventions is so vital to pharmaceutical companies, they
tend to focus on obtaining "strong legal protection" in the form of
multiple patents relating to "discrete" technologies, such as the active
molecule in a single pharmaceutical drug.212 Patents in the pharmaceu-
tical industry thus tend to "correspond to high value innovations," or
at least innovations that threaten the commercial footing of their com-
these industries require substantial upfront investment, and patent rights help recoup those
investments).
205 See id.
206 See Matthew Avery, Continuing Abuse of the Hatch-Waxman Act by Pharmaceutical
Patent Holders and the Failure of the 2003 Amendments, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 171, 174 (2008); Jo-
seph A. DiMasi & Henry G. Grabowski, The Cost of Biopharmaceutical R&D: Is Biotech Differ-
ent?, 28 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 469, 477 (2007) (indicating that average time-adjusted
research and development costs are $1.32 billion per new molecule approved by the Food and
Drug Administration ("FDA")).
207 Avery, supra note 206, at 174.
208 Robin Feldman & W. Nicholson Price II, Patent Trolling: Why Bio & Pharmaceuticals
Are at Risk, 17 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 773, 786 (2014).
209 See Avery, supra note 206, at 172.
210 See DAVID SCHWARTZMAN, INNOVATION IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 4 (1976).
211 DIETMAR HARHOFF ET AL., THE STRATEGIC USE OF PATENTS AND ITS IMPLICATIONS




petitors. 213 This high value, in turn, is likely to correspond with high
rates of patent assertion in the face of patent infringement.
The pharmaceutical industry also includes an important regula-
tory overlay-in particular, the Hatch-Waxman Act2 1 4 -that bolsters
the value of pharmaceutical patents and makes patent assertion in the
face of infringement more likely. To show how, some brief back-
ground on Hatch-Waxman is necessary.
The parts of Hatch-Waxman most critical to this Section's analy-
sis relate to generic drug manufacturers. A key part of Hatch-Wax-
man's purpose was to make it easier for generic drug companies to
introduce lower-cost generic versions of popular drugs to the mar-
ket. 21 5 One way Hatch-Waxman does this is by allowing generic drug
makers to piggyback on a pioneering firm's clinical results by filing an
Abbreviated New Drug Application ("ANDA") and otherwise show-
ing bioequivalence to the FDA-approved product.216 In other words,
the generic manufacturer need not undertake all the expensive clinical
trials itself.
Furthermore, if the generic manufacturer certifies as part of its
ANDA that its product does not infringe any relevant patents of the
brand-name firm or that the patents are invalid (called a Paragraph IV
certification), the generic company receives a 180-day market exclu-
sivity period.217 This exclusivity period means that the FDA will not
approve other generic companies to market a similar generic product
during that period, which starts once the generic company actually
starts marketing its own generic product.2 18
When a generic company makes a Paragraph IV certification, the
brand-name company receives notice of it and has forty-five days to
bring an infringement suit against the generic company, since Hatch-
Waxman defines making a Paragraph IV certification as an act of in-
fringement. 219 If the brand-name company initiates a patent infringe-
ment suit, the FDA automatically grants a thirty-month stay to
213 BRONWYN H. HALL, THE USE AND VALUE OF PATENT RIGHTS 11 (2009), https://
www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/aia-implementation/ipp-2011novO8-ukipo-2.pdf.
214 Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417,
98 Stat. 1585.
215 Avery, supra note 206, at 175.
216 Id. at 175-77 (reviewing key provisions of the Hatch-Waxman Act, including the exclu-
sivity period for the first generic drug maker to challenge the patents of a brand-name drug
maker).
217 Id. at 177-78.
218 Id. at 178.
219 Id. at 177.
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approving the ANDA application. 2 2 0 This has the effect of expanding
the brand-name company's patent rights, since if the ANDA were oth-
erwise approved, the generic company could take its chances and sim-
ply begin to market the generic product. 2 2 1
This regulatory structure thus increases the value of pharmaceuti-
cal patents in several key ways, which in turn makes it more likely that
a patent owner will assert its rights against infringers. First, the reality
that generic companies often challenge a brand-name company's pat-
ents in pursuit of market exclusivity is likely to enhance the patent
optimization approach to pharmaceutical patenting mentioned above.
In other words, these regulatory interventions should also lead phar-
maceutical companies to carefully vet and obtain high-value patents
that are highly likely to be found valid and infringed.
Second, these provisions increase the value of pharmaceutical
patents by providing them with regulatory enhancements. The auto-
matic thirty-month stay, for instance, provides patentees with a form
of injunctive relief without the need to make the typical showing. 222
Indeed, the ability of brand-name companies to sue generic entrants
for infringement before actual market entry allows them to avoid any
lost revenues. 223 These regulatory enhancements thus simultaneously
boost the value of pharmaceutical patents and the likelihood that the
owner thereof will assert them.
Of course, patent activity within the pharmaceutical industry also
occurs outside of the ANDA context. 2 24 For instance, pharmaceutical
companies are increasingly turning to biologic drugs, often sourcing
them from biotechnology companies, and generic versions of biologic
drugs are regulated differently than those of traditional pharmaceuti-
cal products. 2 2 5 Nonetheless, the ANDA context is an important set-
ting for many patent assertions in the pharmaceutical industry.226
220 Id.
221 See Rebecca S. Eisenberg & Daniel A. Crane, Patent Punting: How FDA and Antitrust
Courts Undermine the Hatch-Waxman Act to Avoid Dealing with Patents, 21 MICH. TELECOMM.
& TECH. L. REV. 197, 208-09 (2015).
222 Id. at 209.
223 Id.
224 John R. Allison & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, How Courts Adjudicate Patent Definiteness
and Disclosure, 65 DUKE L.J. 609, 640 n.80 (2016).
225 See Ryan Timmis, The Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act: Potential
Problems in the Biologic-Drug Regulatory Scheme, 13 Nw. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 215, 222-23
(2015).
226 See Jacob S. Sherkow, Describing Drugs: A Response to Professors Allison and Ouel-
lette, 65 DUKE L.J. ONLINE 127, 129-30 (2016) (discussing the different types of pharmaceutical
industry litigation, with ANDA litigation being a prominent form thereof).
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Furthermore, the high value of pharmaceutical patents even outside
the ANDA context means that, in the face of infringement, patent
assertions in the pharmaceutical industry are still likely.
In sum, pharmaceutical patents on average exhibit high value,
both because of the heavy costs associated with pharmaceutical re-
search and development, and because of the FDA regulatory structure
that governs pharmaceutical products. This high value, in turn, makes
it likely that pharmaceutical patent owners will assert their patents
against potential infringers.
2. Search Costs
Search costs are likely to be lower in the pharmaceutical industry
than in other industries. And Hatch-Waxman has a great deal to do
with this. For instance, Hatch-Waxman requires brand-name compa-
nies to list in their New Drug Application ("NDA") any of their pat-
ents that they believe apply to the new drug.2 2 7 Once the FDA
approves the NDA, it is published with information about the applica-
ble patents, in what is informally called the "Orange Book." 2 2 8
When a generic company files an ANDA in hopes of producing a
generic version of an FDA-approved drug, they are required to ad-
dress any patents listed in the Orange Book for the drug, including a
potential Paragraph IV certification, as discussed above.229 Hence, in
many cases, owners of pharmaceutical patents need only list their pat-
ents relevant to a new drug in the Orange Book and then wait for
notifications of infringement.230 They need not incur costs in monitor-
ing the market for infringers-Hatch-Waxman requires generic com-
panies that file ANDAs to notify them of infringement, including in
Paragraph IV certifications, with "a detailed statement of the factual
and legal basis of the opinion of the applicant that the patent is invalid
or will not be infringed." 231
Of course, pharmaceutical patent owners do incur costs in deter-
mining which of their patents belong in the Orange Book in the first
place. But even these costs are likely to be relatively low, in large part
because the scope and meaning of pharmaceutical patents is often
much easier to decipher than, say, software patents.23 2 As a result, de-
227 Natalie M. Derzko, The Impact of Recent Reforms of the Hatch-Waxman Scheme on
Orange Book Strategic Behavior and Pharmaceutical Innovation, 45 IDEA 165, 169 (2005).
228 Id.
229 Id. at 173.
230 Eisenberg & Crane, supra note 221, at 209.
231 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(B)(iv)(II) (2012).
232 Lemley, supra note 137, at 930.
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termining which patents apply to which drugs is likely to be relatively
straightforward in many cases. And once pharmaceutical patent own-
ers have made these determinations, many of their search costs are at
an end.
Even outside of the Hatch-Waxman context, search costs associ-
ated with pharmaceutical patents are low for other reasons. For in-
stance, there are simply fewer participants in the pharmaceutical
industry than, say, the software industry.233 Consequently, it is much
easier for the limited number of industry players to monitor each
other. Furthermore, even though pharmaceutical companies are in-
creasingly sourcing biologic drugs, 2 34 the regulatory structure gov-
erning generics of most biologic drugs still requires generic companies
to consult with the pioneering firm about relevant patents.235 While
these consultations may increase other types of costs, they nonetheless
reduce search costs that may otherwise deter patent assertion.
In sum, search costs in the pharmaceutical industry are likely to
be relatively low for at least two reasons. First, the regulatory overlays
applicable to the industry often force infringers to self-identify. And
second, the industry simply has fewer parties to monitor. As a result,
search costs in the pharmaceutical industry are unlikely to dissuade
parties from asserting their patents against infringers, instead increas-
ing the likelihood that such assertions will occur.
3. Negotiation Costs
Several factors are likely to lead to moderate negotiation costs in
the pharmaceutical industry, at least pre-litigation. First, in the ANDA
context, a generic company that makes a Paragraph IV certification
must include in that certification "a detailed statement of the factual
and legal basis of the opinion of the applicant that the patent is invalid
or will not be infringed." 236 With respect to generic versions of bio-
logic products (called "biosimilars"), the generic company is typically
required to provide similar information as part of a series of patent
consultations that the regulations call for.2 3 7 Hence, because of these
233 See, e.g., Mike Benson, Understanding the Pharmaceutical Industry: An Easier Way to
Understand the Pharma Industry, MARKET REALIST (Jan. 22, 2015, 2:06 PM), http://marketrealist
.com/2015/01/easier-way-understand-pharma-industry/ (listing six publicly traded drug
manufacturers).
234 W. Nicholson Price II & Arti K. Rai, Manufacturing Barriers to Biologics Competition
and Innovation, 101 IOWA L. REv. 1023, 1026 (2016).
235 Timmis, supra note 225, at 224-26 (reviewing these procedures).
236 21 U.S.C. § 3550)(2)(B)(iv)(II).
237 Timmis, supra note 225, at 224.
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requirements, brand-name patent owners will already have a signifi-
cant amount of information relating to the generic company's factual
and legal positions. And that information will save negotiation time
that would otherwise be needed to make these assessments.
Second, some recent evidence indicates that ANDA litigation is
much more likely to go to trial than non-ANDA litigation, in part be-
cause maintaining market exclusivity is so important to brand-name
companies. 238 This means that for a host of important patent asser-
tions in the pharmaceutical industry, negotiation costs pre-litigation
may be lower simply because the parties are set on fully litigating the
matter. 2 39 Of course, this same reality may also increase litigation costs
in the cases that go to trial. But that is a different (though related)
category of costs, discussed more fully below.
The prevalence of "reverse payment" patent settlement agree-
ments in the pharmaceutical industry may increase negotiation costs
in some cases.240 These "pay-for-delay" settlements typically involve
the patent owner agreeing to drop its infringement lawsuit while also
paying the generic company to refrain from producing or selling the
allegedly infringing product for a period up until the patent expires.241
But these types of settlements typically occur subsequent to the patent
holder initiating litigation, 242 and thus will also be discussed more fully
below.
Patent assertions relating to biologic drugs may include higher
negotiation costs than in the ANDA context. This is so, in part, be-
cause the Hatch-Waxman regulatory equivalent for most generic bio-
logic drugs is simply less straightforward. For instance, no Orange
Book exists for biologic drugs.243 Instead, biologic drug patent owners
and would-be generic manufacturers are directed to engage in several
patent consultations before any litigation commences. 244 The regula-
tory structure for follow-on biologic drugs thus seems to impose heav-
ier negotiation costs on biologic drug patent holders than in the
ANDA context.
238 Tammy Facey, The Rise of Anti-ANDA Litigation, IPPRO LIFE Sci., Nov. 27, 2014, at 10,
http://www.ipprolifesciences.com/ipprolifesciences/IPPro%2OLife%2OSciencesissue_33.pdf.
239 See id.
240 Henry N. Butler & Jeffrey Paul Jarosch, Policy Reversal on Reverse Payments: Why
Courts Should Not Follow the New DOJ Position on Reverse-Payment Settlements of Pharmaceu-
tical Patent Litigation, 96 IOWA L. REv. 57, 60 (2010) (discussing this phenomenon).
241 See id.
242 See id. at 63-65.
243 See Timmis, supra note 225, at 224-25.
244 See id.
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Despite these potentially significant negotiation costs relating to
biologic drugs, several factors may still often temper negotiation costs
in the pharmaceutical industry overall. First, traditional pharmaceuti-
cal products are still subject to Hatch-Waxman, and its structure is
likely to frequently reduce negotiation costs relating to patent asser-
tions, as discussed above.245
Second, the limited number of participants in the pharmaceutical
industry is also likely to reduce negotiation costs, in part because par-
ties to a patent dispute will often be repeat players and thus have
some familiarity with each other.2 46 Such relationships can, therefore,
help reduce negotiation costs that may otherwise arise when parties
lack such familiarity.
Third, the (often) relatively clear boundaries of pharmaceutical
patents may also help keep in check negotiation costs in the pharma-
ceutical industry. 247 For instance, the parties to a patent dispute in the
pharmaceutical industry need not spend as much time on deciphering
the meaning and boundaries of relevant patents as they would, say, in
the software industry. This is true in part because pharmaceutical pat-
ents often have a 1:1 relationship to a particular drug, whereas in
software (and other industries), a single product may be covered by
thousands of patents.248 In many pharmaceutical cases, these realities
are, therefore, likely to help reduce some of the complexity of negoti-
ations, thereby also reducing the costs thereof.
In sum, negotiation costs are unlikely to act as much of a deter-
rent to patent assertions in the pharmaceutical industry. While negoti-
ation costs relating to biologic drugs in particular may be significant,
other factors suggest pre-litigation negotiation costs are likely to be
moderate in many other cases. Perhaps even more importantly, the
high value of pharmaceutical patents is likely to dictate assertion, even
if negotiation costs are relatively high.
4. Litigation Costs
As in other industries, litigation costs in the pharmaceutical in-
dustry are likely to be high in part because patent litigation is expen-
sive. Yet, several factors unique to the pharmaceutical industry may
increase litigation costs. First, as mentioned above, in many cases
ANDA litigation proceeds all the way to trial, thereby increasing liti-
245 See supra notes 221-23 and accompanying text.
246 See Facey, supra note 238, at 10.
247 See Lemley, supra note 137, at 930.
248 See id. at 931.
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gation costs. 2 4 9 Second, for those cases that do not proceed to trial, the
prevalence of reverse-payment settlements means that costs rise be-
cause of the extensive (and typically complicated) negotiations relat-
ing to such settlements.250
There are, however, some potentially mitigating factors. First, the
clearer meaning and scope of many pharmaceutical patents relative to
other patent types may reduce the complexity of some phases of a
typical pharmaceutical patent litigation (such as claim construction,
where the court determines the patent's meaning), thereby reducing
litigation costs overall. Second, some recent scholarship suggests that
high litigation costs are largely attributable to fact discovery relating
to remedial issues.2 5 1 Yet ANDA litigation in particular would seem to
avoid such costs since damages and willfulness are not at stake. 2 52
Third, most ANDA litigation (and pharmaceutical patent litigation in
general) occurs in several district courts, resulting in a certain amount
of judicial efficiency.253 And finally, given the limited number of par-
ticipants in the industry overall, many of the litigants are repeat play-
ers with some familiarity with each other, the courts, and the relevant
judges.254 This, too, can contribute to judicial efficiencies and reduce
litigation costs. 2 55
Nonetheless, in most cases these factors seem unlikely to signifi-
cantly cabin litigation costs in the face of ANDA trials, complicated
reverse-payment settlements, and the high costs of patent litigation in
general. Indeed, while they may result in some cost savings, those sav-
ings are likely to be only modest and in many cases offset by other
expensive particularities of pharmaceutical patent litigation.256 In fact,
some recent evidence suggests that ANDA litigation in particular is
similar in its costs relative to other forms of patent litigation.257
249 See supra note 238 and accompanying text.
250 See supra notes 240-41 and accompanying text.
251 See Greg Reilly, Linking Patent Reform and Civil Litigation Reform, 47 Loy. U. CHI.
L.J. 179, 181-82 (2015).
252 Id. at 217.
253 See Katherine Rhoades, Do Not Pass Go, Do Not Stop for Summary Judgment: The
U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware's Seemingly Disjunctive Yet Efficient Procedures
in Hatch-Waxman Litigation, 14 Nw. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 81, 83 (2016).
254 Facey, supra note 238, at 10.
255 See generally Rhoades, supra note 253, at 99 (arguing that local patent rules can increase
efficiency in litigation).
256 See, e.g., AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAw Ass'N, 2015 REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SUR-
VEY 37-38 (2015), http://files.ctctcdn.comle79ee274201/b6ced6c3-dlee-4ee7-9873-352dbe8d8fd.
pdf (showing that the costs of ANDA litigation are similar or in some cases higher than the costs
of patent litigation in general).
257 Id.
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In sum, litigation costs are likely to be high in the pharmaceutical
industry in large part because patent litigation is expensive. And while
certain judicial efficiencies may help rein in some of these costs, the
growing prevalence of trials in ANDA litigation and complicated re-
verse-payment settlements may often eliminate whatever tempering
otherwise occurs. Nevertheless, the importance of maintaining market
exclusivity in most cases likely offsets these high costs in terms of
whether patent owners choose to assert their patents.
5. Invalidity Costs
As discussed above, parties that assert their patents always face
risks that a court or other reviewing tribunal will find their patents
invalid. Some evidence, for instance, indicates that courts find a rela-
tively high percentage of litigated patents invalid.2 58 Nonetheless,
there is also evidence that pharmaceutical patentees face lesser risks
in this regard. For instance, some (albeit limited) evidence indicates
that pharmaceutical patents are much more likely to be found valid
than patents in other fields. 25 9
This may be true for several reasons. For instance, as discussed
above, pharmaceutical patents in general have clearer boundaries and
meaning than software and other types of patents. 26 0 This is often so
because "the structure of a molecule or the composition of a mixture
can be defined with precision," resulting in more definite notice of
what the patent covers and what, therefore, the relevant prior art is.261
Indeed, the nature of pharmaceutical inventions dictates precision in
patent drafting in order to clearly claim the invented pharmaceutical
product while distinguishing it from previous chemical inventions. 262
And that reality likely leads to many more valid pharmaceutical pat-
ents than in other industries. Assertions relating to biologic drugs, on
the other hand, present greater risks of invalidity costs, a topic that
this Article examines in greater detail below. 26 3
In sum, on average the risk of incurring invalidity costs may be
lower in the pharmaceutical industry than in other areas, even if the
258 Allison & Lemley, supra note 102, at 205.
259 Id. at 216-17.
260 BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 25, at 152-53.
261 Id.
262 See, e.g., Ronald G. Embry, Jr., How to Improve Drafting Language in Chemical Arts
Patents, LAw360 (July 9, 2015, 10:28 AM), http://www.1aw360.com/articles/674381/how-to-im
prove-drafting-language-in-chemical-arts-patents (stressing the importance of avoiding ambigu-
ity and vagueness in chemical-based patents).
263 See infra Section III.C.1.
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risks remain more than trivial. And these lower risks, combined with
the importance of patent protection in the industry in general, are
likely to lead to higher rates of patent assertion in the industry.
6. Reputational Costs
The reputational costs of asserting patents in the pharmaceutical
industry are likely to be low for a number of reasons. First, the impor-
tance of patents in the industry means that patent assertion, in the
face of infringement, is typically the expectation; each party must pro-
tect its own turf in order to recoup the billions of dollars in research
and development, 264 and other participants in the industry understand
that reality. Second, pharmaceutical patents' generally clearer bound-
aries mean that asserting such patents is less likely to lead to the type
of ire-and thus reputational costs-that assertion of purportedly
vague and ambiguous patents in the software industry causes. And
third, as discussed above, the pharmaceutical industry's regulatory
overlays incentivize parties to assert their patents, thereby diminish-
ing, to some extent, any culpability that parties may otherwise ascribe
to patent asserters.265
Of course, patent asserters may still suffer some reputational
costs for engaging in patent disputes, particularly if their behavior is
egregious in some way266 or the assertion relates to biologic drugs, as
discussed in more detail below.267 Furthermore, some evidence indi-
cates that consumers in general hold negative views of the pharmaceu-
tical industry, and patent assertions may exacerbate those trends. 2 68
Nonetheless, an average, run-of-the-mill patent assertion in the phar-
maceutical industry is unlikely to lead to significant reputational costs
that affect a pharmaceutical company's bottom line. Indeed, for most
pharmaceutical companies, failure to assert patents in the face of in-
fringement is more likely to have such effects.
264 See DiMasi & Grabowski, supra note 206, at 477.
265 See supra Section III.B.1.
266 See, e.g., Kartikay Mehrotra & Pamela MacLean, Merck's Patent Win over Gilead Re-
versed over False Testimony, BLOOMBERG (June 6, 2016, 8:44 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/
news/articles/2016-06-06/gilead-judge-throws-out-merck-s-200-million-patent-verdict.
267 See infra Section III.C.1.
268 Mark Kessel, Restoring the Pharmaceutical Industry's Reputation, 32 NATURE BIOTECH-
NOLOGY 983, 983 (2014), http://www.nature.com/nbt/journal/v32/n10/pdf/nbt.3036.pdf ("[T]he in-
dustry's reputation is not much better than that of the financial sector or tobacco companies.").
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7. Dynamic Costs
Implicit throughout much of the analysis above is a strong dyna-
mism between and among many of the categories of disincentives to
patent assertion. The high value of patents in the pharmaceutical in-
dustry, for instance, may help temper reputational costs that may oth-
erwise result from patent assertions. The lower risks of incurring
invalidity costs, based on the clearer scope and meaning of pharma-
ceutical patents, may also help bolster the value of pharmaceutical
patents while simultaneously reducing reputational costs stemming
from asserting such patents. In many cases, the clearer scope and
meaning of pharmaceutical patents also likely helps reduce search and
negotiation costs.
The overall effect of such dynamism is to remove impediments to
asserting patents in the pharmaceutical industry. The expected result,
therefore, is high rates of pharmaceutical patent assertion. This result,
in turn, may help explain why pharmaceutical companies have not
sought or needed to outsource patent assertion to other entities in the
same way that many software patent holders have. Put simply, in the
pharmaceutical industry the likely benefits of patent assertion, on av-
erage, outweigh the likely costs. As a result, there is no need to shift
those costs in an attempt to realize some benefits from a party's
patents.
Table 3 below summarizes the analysis described above relating
to the pharmaceutical industry.
TABLE 3. DISINCENTIVES TO PATENT ASSERTION IN THE
PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY
Factor Analysis
Value of Patent(s) High. May be increased by lower
risks of invalidity
Search Costs Low. May be indirectly decreased
by lower risk of invalidity costs
Negotiation Costs Low to Moderate. May be
indirectly decreased by lower risk
of invalidity costs
Litigation Costs High. May be exacerbated by
negotiation costs
Invalidity Costs Moderate. May be decreased by
the high value of pharmaceutical
patents
Reputational Costs Low. May be decreased by high
value of pharmaceutical patents
and lower risk of invalidity costs
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C. The Biotechnology and Semiconductor Industries
The last two Sections applied the framework developed in Sec-
tion II.B to the software and pharmaceutical industries. They did so in
order to highlight how the different cost categories likely affect patent
holders in each industry differently in terms of whether they decide to
assert their patents. This Section briefly applies the same framework
to two additional cases: the biotechnology and semiconductor
industries.
The biotechnology industry exhibits many similarities to the phar-
maceutical industry-in fact, the distinction between them has blurred
over time, particularly as traditional pharmaceutical companies in-
creasingly turn to biologic drugs as a new source of revenue. 269 As
such, much of this Article's analysis for the pharmaceutical industry
also applies to the biotechnology industry. Yet despite the similarities,
there are also key differences, and Section 1 below discusses those
differences.
The semiconductor, on the other hand, exhibits many similarities
to the software industry in terms of how disincentives to patent asser-
tion are likely to play out. But again, there are key differences be-
tween the two industries that affect these disincentives. Consequently,
Section 2 below focuses on those differences in assessing patent non-
assertion in the semiconductor industry.
1. Biotechnology
Both the biotechnology and pharmaceutical industries are capital
intensive. 270 This means that, as in the pharmaceutical industry, pat-
ents in the biotechnology industry are also an important means to
recoup the substantial investments necessary to develop biologic
drugs and diagnostics. 2 7 1 Indeed, biologic products are often more ex-
pensive to develop than traditional pharmaceutical products. 272 On
269 Deborah Hopewell, Biotech vs. Pharma: Once Different, Now Collaborative Entities,
SILICON VALLEY Bus. J. (June 22, 2003, 9:00 PM), http://www.bizjournals.com/sanjose/stories/
2003/06/23/focus3.html.
270 Alan Devlin, Systematic Bias in Patent Law, 61 DEPAUL L. REV. 57, 74 (2011) ("Like
pharmaceutical research, innovation in biotechnology is both capital intensive and risky.").
271 See Michael S. Mireles, An Examination of Patents, Licensing, Research Tools, and the
Tragedy of the Anticommons in Biotechnology Innovation, 38 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 141, 143
(2004).
272 See Biologics, Biosimilars, and the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act
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this basis alone, high patent assertion rates would be expected in the
biotechnology industry.
Yet one key difference between the biotechnology and pharma-
ceutical industries is that the products of biotechnology companies
typically have a biological (or natural) basis, rather than a chemically
synthesized one. 2 7 3 For instance, biotechnology companies often focus
on manipulating the genetic information of living organisms in order
to produce some positive result, like helping to treat a disease. 27 4 The
products of traditional pharmaceutical companies, on the other hand,
typically consist of chemically synthesized medicines. 27 5
This difference is crucial in several respects. First, the biological
basis of biotechnological products means that they may be more sus-
ceptible to invalidation because of recent Supreme Court cases that
have expanded exceptions to what is patentable subject matter. For
instance, in 2013 the Court invalidated Myriad Genetics's patents on
isolated DNA sequences used for testing for ovarian and breast can-
cer.2 7 6 The Court held that the patents claimed something found in
nature (i.e., isolated DNA sequences), a category generally outside of
patentable subject matter.2 7 7 In another recent case, the Court ex-
panded the "law of nature" exception to patentable subject matter,
finding that a diagnostic test for determining correct drug dosage
levels was merely a law of nature ineligible for patent protection.278
Hence, because the biological basis for biotechnological products
means that many of them can be readily characterized as natural phe-
nomena or laws of nature, patents claiming them are more at risk of
being invalidated for failing to claim patentable subject matter.279
273 Michelle Ahern, What's the Difference Between Pharmaceutical and Biotechnology?,




276 Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2110-11 (2013).
277 Id.
278 Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1294 (2012).
279 See Kate Gaudry, Leslie Grab & Tina Williams McKeon, Trends in Subject Matter Eligi-
bility for Biotechnology Inventions, IPWATCHDOG (July 12, 2015), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/
2015/07/12/trends-in-subject-matter-eligibility-for-biotechnology-inventions/id=59 7 38/ (showing
that since these decisions, rejection rates for biotechnology patents applications have increased).
Of course, this may also mean that for the patents that do make it through the process, they are
less likely to be invalidated. However, many important biotechnology patents were issued before
the Court's rulings, meaning they are still susceptible to invalidation. Furthermore, even the




This reality thus suggests that biotechnology patent asserters may
be more likely to incur invalidity costs than pharmaceutical patent as-
serters. And these heightened risks, on their own, may dampen bio-
technology patent holders' incentives to assert their patents. Yet these
heightened invalidity costs may often dynamically affect other catego-
ries of costs in ways that further diminish incentives to assert biotech-
nology patents.
For instance, these higher invalidity risks may decrease the value
of biotechnology patents in general, thereby making them less likely
to be asserted. Furthermore, they are likely to increase search and
negotiation costs by injecting greater uncertainty into those activities.
Finally, as biotechnology patent owners appeal more frequent findings
of invalidity, negotiation and litigation costs are also likely to rise.
Overall, these greater risks and costs associated with biotechnology
patents may thus make it less likely that biotechnology patent holders
assert their patents.
The Hatch-Waxman equivalent for biologic drugs further compli-
cates matters. Similar to Hatch-Waxman, part of the purpose for the
Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act ("BPCIA") 2 8 0 was to
make it easier for generic biologic drug manufacturers to introduce
low-cost generic biologic drugs (called "biosimilars") to the market.281
For instance, it allows generic manufacturers of biosimilars to rely on
a pioneering firm's clinical trial data for obtaining FDA approval for
the biosimilar. 282 As part of that process, the Act calls for a series of
patent consultations, which means generic firms are supposed to no-
tify and consult with pioneering firms over relevant patents.283 In gen-
eral, these provisions have the potential to help reduce search,
negotiation, and litigation costs relating to biotechnology patent
assertions.
Yet the BPCIA lacks the equivalent of an Orange Book require-
ment,284 which is likely to translate into greater uncertainty about rele-
280 Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act of 2009, 42 U.S.C. § 262 (2012).
281 See Janet Freilich, Patent Infringement in the Context of Follow-On Biologics, 16 STAN.
TECH. L. REv. 9, 10-11 (2012).
282 See Price & Rai, supra note 234, at 1027-28. Yet such reliance has been rare, in part
because the BPCIA grants the pioneering firm a twelve-year exclusivity period to that clinical
data, meaning that generic companies are barred from using it for a much longer duration than
under Hatch-Waxman with respect to traditional pharmaceutical products. See id.
283 See Timmis, supra note 225, at 224-25.
284 See Terry G. Mahn & Gauri M. Dhavan, Biosimilars vs. Generics-Major Differences in
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vant patents for biologic products. Indeed, the BPCIA is hardly a
model of clarity, and a judge on the nation's preeminent patent court
recently lamented that parts of it are worthy of "the Pulitzer Prize for
complexity or uncertainty." 2 8 5 This uncertainty, in turn, is likely to
boost search, negotiation, and litigation costs by forcing parties to
evaluate a wider array of patents as they engage in negotiations and
litigation. Hence, as courts, patent holders, and generic companies
continue to sort out exactly what the BPCIA's provisions mean,286
biotechnology patent owners are more likely to incur relatively high
search, negotiation, and litigation costs for asserting such patents. And
in many cases, as discussed above, these categories of costs are likely
to exacerbate each other.287
In general, biotechnology companies may also be more likely to
suffer reputational costs when asserting biotechnology patents than
pharmaceutical companies that assert pharmaceutical patents. This
may be so, in part, because the public has often reacted negatively to
patents on living organisms (or parts thereof, such as genetic mate-
rial). 28 8 In Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics,2 8 9 for
instance, significant public outcry arose because the patents at issue
dealt with DNA material. 290 And Myriad, as owner of those (now in-
validated) patents, often absorbed the brunt of that criticism.291 These
reputational costs may lead to greater difficulty in recruiting talented
scientists and less optimism in capital markets. They may also, there-
fore, dissuade companies from taking an aggressive stance with re-
spect to their biotechnology patents. 2 9 2
285 Dennis Crouch, Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act: Refusal to Dance,
PATENTLYO (July 21, 2015), http://patentlyo.com/patent/2015/07/biologics-competition-innova
tion.html (quoting Judge Lourie of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit).
286 See Jeff Overley, Biosimilar Notice Always Mandatory, Fed. Cir. Rules, LAw360 (July 5,
2016, 1:05 PM), http://www.law360.com/ip/articles/792580?nl pk=cab4cac9-5c01-4b78-9f6f-41f04f
29a984&utmsource=newsletter&utm medium=email&utmcampaign=ip (providing one recent
example).
287 See supra Sections III.A.7, III.B.7.
288 See Jonathan King & Doreen Stabinsky, Patents on Cells, Genes, and Organisms Under-
mine the Exchange of Scientific Ideas, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Feb. 5, 1999), http://www.council
forresponsiblegenetics.org/ViewPage.aspx?pageld=171.
289 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013).
290 See Kelly Servick, End of the Road for Myriad Gene Patent Fight, Sci. (Jan. 28, 2015,
3:00 PM), http://www.sciencemag.org/news/2015/01/end-road-myriad-gene-patent-fight (describ-
ing Myriad's patents as "controversial").
291 See id.
292 See id. (describing how Myriad eventually settled many of its patent assertions following
the Supreme Court decision, despite the fact that arguably some of its patents remained intact).
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In sum, the high value of biotechnology patents in maintaining
market exclusivity would seem to predict high rates of patent asser-
tion. Yet those assertions are more likely than their traditional phar-
maceutical counterparts to result in significant search, negotiation,
litigation, invalidity, and reputational costs, all of which may exacer-
bate each other. While these costs may not dissuade many biotechnol-
ogy patent owners from asserting their patents simply because the
value of market exclusivity in the biotechnology space is so high, in
some cases they may. And where they do so, parties may instead turn
to other forms of intellectual property, such as trade secrecy, to pro-
tect their innovations.2 9 3
But another possibility is that growing barriers to patent assertion
in the biotechnology industry will push more biotechnology patent
owners to adopt the software world's patent troll outsourcing
model.294 That is, increasingly more biotechnology patents may come
into the hands of patent assertion entities as biotechnology patent
owners seek to mitigate the increasingly high costs of patent assertion
while still realizing economic returns on their patents. Alternatively,
these high barriers may ultimately lead many biotechnology patent
owners to specialize in patent assertion themselves. And if either of
these two possibilities becomes an industry trend, the biotechnology
industry may experience higher patent assertion rates than would be
expected, since the business models would demand it. The implica-
tions of this possibility will be further explored in Part IV infra.
Table 4 below summarizes the analysis described above relating
to the biotechnology industry.
TABLE 4. DISINCENTIVES TO PATENT ASSERTION IN THE
BIOTECHNOLOGY INDUSTRY
Factor Analysis
Value of Patent(s) High. But may be decreased by
invalidity costs
Search Costs Moderate. May be exacerbated by
invalidity costs
Negotiation Costs Moderate to High. May be
exacerbated by litigation and
invalidity costs
Litigation Costs High. May be exacerbated by
negotiation and invalidity costs
293 See Price & Rai, supra note 234, at 1028, 1044-45.
294 Cf Feldman & Price, supra note 208, at 776 (arguing that the pharmaceutical and bio-
technology industries are increasingly at risk of patent trolls).
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Invalidity Costs Moderate to High
Reputational Costs Moderate to High. May be
indirectly exacerbated by
invalidity costs
2. The Semiconductor Industry
The semiconductor industry focuses on producing "chips" that
help power all types of computing devices, ranging from smartphones
to cars.295 The industry has witnessed significant growth over the past
fifty plus years.296 That growth, particularly in Northern California, ul-
timately gave rise to the now famous "Silicon Valley" moniker for the
region (i.e., silicon material is used to produce semiconductors
chips).297
Semiconductor innovation is said to be "rapid," "cumulative,"
and to include high fixed costs. 298 Hence, chip innovation often occurs
in a matter of a year or two, rather than decades, as in the pharmaceu-
tical industry. 299 Furthermore, because of semiconductor innovation's
cumulative nature, any given chip innovation is likely to include nu-
merous independently patentable inventions, much like many
software innovations. 300
Interestingly, growth in semiconductor innovation has been ac-
companied by a surge in semiconductor industry patenting. 301 Previous
scholarship has assessed this phenomenon, concluding that semicon-
ductor companies obtain patents largely as trading chips in a defensive
patenting scheme.302 In other words, semiconductor companies in-
creasingly obtain large portfolios of patents in order to protect their
295 Paige Tanner, An Overview of the Semiconductor Industry, MKT. REALIST (Sept. 10,
2015, 4:07 PM), http://marketrealist.com/2015/09/overview-semiconductor-industry/.
296 Id.
297 David Laws, "Who Named Silicon Valley?," COMPUTER HIST. MUSEUM (Jan. 7, 2015),
http://www.computerhistory.org/atchm/who-named-silicon-valley/.
298 WERNER BALLHAUS ET AL., FASTER, GREENER, SMARTER-REACHING BEYOND THE
HORIZON IN THE WORLD OF SEMICONDUCTORS 12 (2012), https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/technolo
gy/publications/assets/pwc-faster-greener-smarter.pdf; Burk & Lemley, Policy Levers, supra note
24, at 1627-28; Bronwyn H. Hall & Rosemarie Ham Ziedonis, The Patent Paradox Revisited: An
Empirical Study of Patenting in the U.S. Semiconductor Industry, 1979-1995, 32 RAND J. ECON.
101, 102 (2001).
299 Don Clark, Intel Rechisels the Tablet on Moore's Law, WALL ST. J.: DIGrrs (July 16,
2015, 10:52 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2015/07/16/intel-rechisels-the-tablet-on-moores-law/
(discussing "Moore's Law," a famous prediction in the semiconductor industry that significant
chip innovation would occur on roughly a two-year cycle).
300 Burk & Lemley, Policy Levers, supra note 24, at 1623, 1628.
301 Hall & Ziedonis, supra note 298, at 102.
302 See id. at 104.
702 [Vol. 85:645
PATENT PACIFISM
ability to produce semiconductor chips that may infringe upon any
number of third-party patents.303 Patent portfolios protect their ability
to do so because a third party may be more loathe to sue the com-
pany, or more likely to enter into a cross-license with them, if the
company has patents it can counter-assert against that third party.304
Thus, the semiconductor industry exhibits some similarities to the
software industry that are relevant to predicting patent non-assertion
in the industry. For starters, the industry's rapid, cumulative innova-
tion cycles mean that any given semiconductor patent is likely to be of
low to moderate value (at least in isolation). This is so for at least two
reasons. First, the industry's fast pace of innovation means that com-
panies are often rapidly iterating on their preexisting technology,
thereby making it more likely that any given patent covers only an
incremental improvement upon what came before.3 05 Second, the cu-
mulative nature of semiconductor innovation means that any given
patent typically only covers a "minor part of the whole chip." 306
Hence, the value of any single patent will correspond to the value of
whatever small part of the chip it covers.
This relatively low value of any given semiconductor patent is
thus likely to deter assertion of many such patents, particularly since
the search, negotiation, and litigation costs associated with asserting
the patents may dwarf the expected return. Indeed, search, negotia-
tion, and litigation costs in the semiconductor industry may often be
high, since detecting and ultimately proving infringement often re-
quires costly and time-consuming reverse-engineering of competitive
semiconductor products.307 Furthermore, the "miniature" nature of
semiconductor chips presents unique challenges in drafting and en-
forcing such patents,308 which may increase these same costs, as well as
the risks of incurring invalidity costs more broadly.
Other industry factors may make these costs even more daunting.
For instance, search, negotiation, and litigation costs may be especially
303 Burk & Lemley, Policy Levers, supra note 24, at 1628.
304 Id.
305 Eric Brown, Rediscovering Fundamental Innovation, MIT NEWS (Dec. 3, 2015), http://
news.mit.edu/2015/rediscovering-fundamental-innovation-eugene-fitzgerald-1203; Bruce Upbin,
Silicon Valley Isn't Innovative, It's Iterative: Four Proof Points, FORBES (Apr. 8, 2014, 10:52
AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ciocentral/2014/04/08/silicon-valley-isnt-innovative-its-itera
tive-four-proof-points/#79f34a5f75f3.
306 Burk & Lemley, Policy Levers, supra note 24, at 1628.
307 See Doris Johnson Hines & Howard Herr, Drafting and Enforcing Semiconductor Pat-
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cumbersome because, as discussed above, producing innovative chips
is capital intensive and expected to occur in a relatively short time
frame. 30 9 Diverting significant resources into an aggressive patent as-
sertion campaign, therefore, may often distract semiconductor compa-
nies from their commercial goals. This may be particularly true if
semiconductor companies are able to protect their investments
through other means, such as lead-time advantages, trade secrecy, and
manufacturing and design capabilities.310
The reputational costs of asserting semiconductor patents are
likely less significant than those associated with asserting software pat-
ents. This is so, in part, because the semiconductor industry has not
directly experienced an "open innovation" movement like that in the
software industry.311 Nonetheless, because chip innovation involves,
and even often depends on, software innovation, the norms of
software's open innovation movement have affected the semiconduc-
tor industry as well. Indeed, some of the top semiconductor compa-
nies in the world, including Intel and Samsung, tout their open
innovation credentials on the companies' websites. 312 In fact, Intel
claims that it "has been at the heart of the open source [movement]"
since its beginnings, 313 pointing out that the company employs
"thousands of software developers" devoted to working on open
source software projects. 3 1 4
Hence, reputational costs for asserting semiconductor patents are
likely to be at least moderate for many semiconductor patent holders.
And they may grow the more aggressively a semiconductor company
asserts its patents. As such, these potential reputational costs, com-
bined with moderate to high search, negotiation, and litigation costs,
are likely to dissuade numerous semiconductor patent holders from
309 See supra note 299 and accompanying text.
310 See Hall & Ziedonis, supra note 298, at 102.
311 Nicole Hemsoth, Can Open Source Hardware Crack Semiconductor Industry Econom-
ics?, THE NEXT PLATFORM (May 16, 2016), http://www.nextplatform.com/2016/05/16/can-open-
source-hardware-crack-semiconductor-industry-economics/ (discussing how an open innovation
model may help spur the semiconductor industry forward).
312 See Open Source in Action, INTEL: DEVELOPER ZONE, https://software.intel.com/en-us/
open-source [https://perma.cc/YP28-6F82] (last visited May 31, 2017); Open Innovation, Assem-
blies for a New Future, SAMSUNG, http://www.samsung.com/semiconductor/about-us/open-inno
vation/ [https://perma.cc/J6C6-HVMD] (last visited May 31, 2017).
313 How Intel Drives the Open Source Spirit Forward, INTEL: BIT FEED, https://con-
nect.intel.com/B8160108_how-inteldrivesthe-open-source-spirit-forward [https://perma.cc/
DFX2-7DBL] (last visited May 31, 2017).
314 Helping Establish Linux* Globally, INTEL: DEVELOPER ZONE, https://software.intel.
comlen-us/open-source/linux-kernel [https://perma.cc/5CUP-PUTL] (last visited May 31, 2017).
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actively asserting many of their patents. This may be particularly true
if the average value of a semiconductor patent is relatively low, as
discussed above.
Of course, none of this is to say that patents play an insignificant
role in the industry. As mentioned above, patenting in the semicon-
ductor industry has increased as parties race to build large patent
portfolios in order to better ensure their freedom to operate. 15 In this
setting, in fact, early-stage patent assertions frequently occur as par-
ties approach each other and ultimately negotiate cross-licenses to
their respective patent portfolios.316 But this activity largely centers on
trading patent portfolios in whole, thereby minimizing many of the
search, negotiation, litigation, invalidity, and reputational costs that
would otherwise result if the parties were assessing and asserting indi-
vidual patents. 17 Hence, while the semiconductor industry appears to
utilize a predominantly portfolio-oriented form of patent assertion,
that approach seems intended to avoid many of the costs that would
otherwise deter patent assertion.318
Table 5 below summarizes the analysis described above relating
to the semiconductor industry. Note that many of the dynamic rela-
tionships between categories of disincentives in the semiconductor in-
dustry are likely similar to those found in the software industry.
Hence, the analysis from Section III.A is simply reflected in the table
below.
TABLE 5. DISINCENTIVES TO PATENT ASSERTION IN THE
SEMICONDUCTOR INDUSTRY
Factor Analysis
Value of Patent(s) Low to Moderate. May be
decreased by invalidity and
reputational costs
Search Costs High. May be exacerbated by
negotiation, litigation, and
invalidity costs
Negotiation Costs High. May be exacerbated by
litigation and invalidity costs
Litigation Costs High. May be exacerbated by
negotiation and invalidity costs
315 See supra note 303 and accompanying text.
316 See Burk & Lemley, Policy Levers, supra note 24, at 1624, 1628.
317 See Parchomovsky & Wagner, supra note 20, at 64.
318 See id. at 32-36 (arguing that the true value of patents for many parties lies in
aggregation).
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Invalidity Costs Moderate to High. May be
exacerbated by reputational
factors
Reputational Costs Moderate to High. May be
exacerbated by perceptions that
semiconductor patents have low
value or are invalid
Overall, these relatively high barriers to patent assertion may
portend greater risks of patent trolling in the semiconductor industry.
In fact, the industry has already witnessed a good amount of patent
troll activity, both from patent trolls and formerly manufacturing
semiconductor companies. 319 Furthermore, the industry's high and
growing fixed costs 32 0 may presage increasingly more formerly
manufacturing semiconductor companies focusing on patent assertion.
Indeed, specialization is a necessity for many semiconductor patent
holders, 3 21 and one particularly lucrative specialty may be patent
assertion.322 The next Part now turns to assessing some possible
implications of this Article's industry-specific analysis of disincentives
to patent assertion.
IV. IMPLICATIONS
Parts I through III of this Article laid out a more systematic, in-
dustry-specific approach to explaining why patent holders may choose
to forego asserting their patents. This Part assesses in greater depth
some of the normative, theoretical, and practical implications of that
approach.
From a normative perspective, when patent holders forego assert-
ing their rights, society may be better off. This normative claim has a
clear theoretical basis. Predominant patent law theories, after all, rec-
ognize that patents impose deadweight losses on society by artificially
increasing the costs of using the patented invention. 3 2 3 But at least
some of that deadweight loss, according to these theories, is the neces-
sary price for incentivizing parties to engage in inventive behavior,
319 Osenga, supra note 32, at 455-57; Caught in the Patent Currents, WORLD INTELL. PROP.
REv., March/April 2015, at 38, 40; Todd R. Miller, Patent Litigation and Prosecution Trends in
the Semiconductor Industry, JONESDAY IP PERSP., Fall/Winter 2007, at 10, 11.
320 Stefan Tamme et al., Trends and Opportunities in Semiconductor Licensing, 48 LES
NOUVELLEs 216, 218 (2013).
321 Id.
322 Caught in the Patent Currents, supra note 319, at 39.
323 See, e.g., Tom Nicholas, What Drives Innovation?, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 787, 787 (2011)
("Some theoretical work on intellectual property rights assumes a positive correlation between
the strength of patent protection and the rate of innovation, but in the short run, patents also
impose a deadweight loss arising from monopoly pricing." (footnote omitted)).
[Vol. 85:645706
PATENT PACIFISM
share their inventions with the public, and further develop them.3 24
Hence, in industries where parties acquire ever-increasing numbers of
patents but forego asserting them because of high costs, the best of
both worlds may be possible. And this may be especially true if we
think that greater disincentives to assertion on the backend will not
affect incentives to engage in inventive behavior on the frontend, as
some recent scholarship suggests.3 25
Yet the software industry's experience over the last several de-
cades is instructive on this score. As discussed, high barriers to patent
assertion in the software industry seem to have actually helped in-
crease patent assertion rates in the industry.326 This came about in part
as more and more software patent holders outsourced the high costs
and risks of patent assertion to patent trolls, or engaged in patent trol-
ling themselves in order to realize economies of scale. And once such
outsourcing or specialization occurs, patent assertion is likely to in-
crease, since these business models demand ever-increasing patent as-
sertions to survive. Too high of barriers to patent assertion may thus
distort disincentives to patent assertion in ways that actually increase
patent assertions. Moderate barriers to patent assertion, therefore,
may actually result in lower rates of assertion with, in all likelihood,
similar levels of patenting. 327 And such an outcome may be ideal, since
high levels of patenting combined with relatively moderate assertion
rates may mean society is benefitting from high levels of innovation,
but with fewer deadweight losses.328
Yet this analysis, while perhaps persuasive in some respects,
leaves several open questions that current patent law reform efforts
must grapple with. First, it is likely to be extremely difficult in many
cases to reliably distinguish ex ante between "good" moderate barri-
ers and "bad" high barriers to patent assertion. In other words, the
324 See Gideon Parchomovsky & Peter Siegelman, Towards an Integrated Theory of Intel-
lectual Property, 88 VA. L. REV. 1455, 1458-59 (2002).
325 See Lemley, supra note 68, at 50-52.
326 See supra Section III.A.8.
327 See Lemley, supra note 68, at 14.
328 Too low of barriers to patent assertion may also be problematic. For instance, as dis-
cussed above, the pharmaceutical industry includes a regulatory overlay that in some sense
forces patent assertion, or at least makes it much more likely by pushing patent holders and
infringers to self-identify. See supra Section III.B. Hence, without such regulatory interventions,
it seems likely that fewer patent holders would assert their patents, thereby reducing deadweight
losses on society that such assertions otherwise impose. Of course, it may be true that these types
of regulatory interventions are necessary to spur pharmaceutical innovation in the first place,
notwithstanding the deadweight losses that they may cause. But that is a project, or a set of
projects, beyond the scope of the present Article.
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line between barriers that lead to moderate-to-low patent assertion
rates and barriers that contribute to patent assertion outsourcing or
specialization is often likely to be blurry. As a result, policymakers
seeking to strike the right balance face inherent difficulties in accu-
rately anticipating the effects of their reforms. Indeed, recent reforms
such as the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act, though
meant to facilitate biotechnology innovation, may actually harm it by
raising the costs of patent assertion and thereby increasing patent as-
sertion outsourcing or specialization.329 Hence, though moderate bar-
riers to patent assertion may be the ideal outcome in the abstract, it
remains difficult in practice to reliably distinguish between moderate
and high barriers to patent assertion.
Second, it is also the case that not all high barriers to patent as-
sertion will result in increased patent assertions. For instance, some
barriers to patent assertion may be so high that even patent trolls find
them too great to justify their business model. The software world
may have experienced such a shock recently with the Supreme Court's
Alice decision briefly discussed above.330 Indeed, since the decision,
most current software patents may be invalid.331 And that near cer-
tainty is deterring at least some former patent trolls from continuing
their line of business. 3 3 2 Thus, such high barriers may deter, rather
than increase, patent assertions. And if that is true, then it may also be
true that high barriers to patent assertion are preferable to moderate
ones, so long as they are the right kind of high barriers.
But this conclusion is dubious because these types of high barri-
ers seem more likely than others to simultaneously deter patent asser-
tions and innovation. That is, barriers to patent assertion that are so
high that they effectively undermine patent protection in an industry
may certainly lead to lower rates of assertion in that industry, simply
because there is no point in trying to obtain or enforce patents in the
industry given these barriers. But the same inability to enforce patents
in an industry also means that those barriers are more likely to under-
mine innovation in that industry. This may be so, for instance, if pat-
ents are important incentives to innovative behavior, as predominant
329 See supra Section III.C.1.
330 See supra notes 125-31 and accompanying text.
331 See Quinn, supra note 129 (quoting Professor Mark Lemley as saying that after Alice,
most current software patents are invalid).
332 See Claire Bushey, Why This Lawyer Is Rethinking Patent Lawsuits, CRAIN'S CHI. Bus.
(June 6, 2015), http://www.chicagobusiness.com/article/20150606/ISSUE01/306069991/why-this-
lawyer-is-rethinking-patent-lawsuits (discussing how patent law changes, including the Alice de-
cision, have reduced the incentives of some patent trolls to pursue their typical business model).
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patent law theories teach. 333 Per those theories, many parties will
forego inventive behavior without at least some ability to prevent
others from duplicating their inventive efforts (or otherwise economi-
cally benefit from them).334 And if specific high barriers in an industry
or field mean that enforcing patent rights is largely implausible, then
many such parties may decline to engage in socially beneficial inven-
tive behavior. Some recent scholarship puts this general theoretical
premise into question.335 But it nonetheless remains important to thor-
oughly assess the societal impacts of specific high barriers that de-
crease rather than increase patent assertions, because the perverse
impact may be less innovative behavior as well. Current reform ef-
forts, many of which aim to erect higher barriers to patent assertion to
curb patent trolling,336 must thus take into account a dual reality: some
high barriers to patent assertion may actually increase patent asser-
tions, while those that decrease patent assertions may simultaneously
deter socially beneficial innovation.
Yet there may be a subset of high barriers to patent assertion that
decreases patent assertions overall while also preserving patents as
important incentives to innovative behavior. For instance, this subset
may thread the needle by specifically targeting patent assertion out-
sourcing and specialization. 3 3 7 In other words, these types of barriers
may impose moderate costs on most patent holders, while inflicting
higher costs on those that engage in patent assertion specialization or
outsourcing. Recent reform proposals aimed at increasing visibility
into the parties behind patent assertions may be one example of gen-
erally moderate barriers that transform into high barriers for a partic-
ular subset of patent assertion types,338 since such reforms would force
these types of parties to more fully internalize the costs, including in
particular reputational ones, of outsourcing or otherwise obscuring
abusive patterns of patent assertion.
333 See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 37, at 129-131.
334 See supra Part I.
335 See Lemley, supra note 68, at 52 (noting the lack of evidence proving that the patent
system drives innovation).
336 See Patent Progress's Guide to Federal Patent Reform Legislation, PAT. PROGRESS, http:/
/www.patentprogress.org/patent-progress-legislation-guides/patent-progresss-guide-patent-re
form-legislation/ [https://perma.cc/47LS-US8K] (last visited May 31, 2017).
337 Cf Lemley & Melamed, supra note 4, at 2172 (arguing against patent law reforms
targeting specific types of entities, instead suggesting that reforms should focus on patterns of
abusive behavior).
338 Simon Rockman, New US Bill Aims to Zap Patent Trolls with Transparency Demands,
REGISTER (Jun. 5, 2015, 3:56 PM), http://www.theregister.co.uk/2015/06/05/us-billaimsto-re
duce-patenttrolfing/.
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Accordingly, while moderate barriers to patent assertion may re-
present an ideal outcome from a normative and theoretical perspec-
tive, in practice striking that balance is difficult. This difficulty has at
least two important causes. First, it is simply difficult to know in ad-
vance how patent law changes will affect patent assertion costs in a
given industry. For instance, some well-intentioned reforms may raise
barriers to patent assertion above optimal levels such that they actu-
ally increase patent assertion outsourcing or specialization, thereby ar-
guably undermining innovation. Second, it would appear that the best
kind of moderate barriers to patent assertion are those that are mod-
erate for most patent holders, while imposing higher costs on specific
patterns of patent assertion such as outsourcing or specialization. Yet
striking that balance is difficult, and if done improperly, may in some
cases harm innovation in an industry by rendering patent enforcement
impractical for a larger subset of patent holders than is warranted. The
devil, as always, is in the details.
CONCLUSION
Scholars have long puzzled over why parties amass large numbers
of patents, only to forego asserting them in the vast majority of cases.
In response, they have offered a variety of general economic reasons
to explain this phenomenon. Yet these explanations typically lack any
sort of industry specificity, despite the reality that patents play vastly
different roles across industries, as others have recognized for some
time.
This Article provides a more industry-specific approach to ex-
plaining patent non-assertion, charting out a taxonomy of different
costs that are likely to affect a patent holder's assertion versus non-
assertion decision. And crucially, this Article claims, this taxonomy is
likely to play out differently depending on which industry is under the
microscope.
Some industries that exhibit high barriers to patent assertion
ironically also exhibit higher rates of patent assertion. The software
industry demonstrates this trend clearly. This reality leads to the im-
portant insight that high barriers to patent assertion may result in
higher than expected rates of patent assertion as patent holders shift
the high costs of patent assertion to patent assertion entities or spe-
cialize in patent assertion themselves. Hence, current reform propos-
als should take such factors into account so that well-intentioned
patent reforms aimed at curbing abusive patent assertions do not un-
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intentionally increase patent assertion in other industries by erecting
similar barriers.
Yet properly demarcating the line between acceptable and too
high of barriers in a given industry is difficult for a variety of reasons,
in part because it is difficult to know how patent law changes will play
out. But the most promising changes would appear to be those that
erect moderate barriers to patent assertion in general, while increas-
ing costs for certain patterns of patent assertion, such as outsourcing
or specialization. Threading that needle, of course, presents significant
challenges. Yet it remains a challenge worth tackling.
